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Abstract
This thesis aims to answer questions on heterogeneity found in individual
decision making owing to differences in preferences and motives.
In the first chapter I examine how individual’s gender affects bargaining
behaviour in an Ultimatum Game. I use a method of priming to make differences
in gender roles salient. The results show that due to the prime, both men and
women responder ask for a lower minimum acceptable offer when they are partnered
with a male proposer, after controlling for personality traits, intelligence and risk
preferences. Regardless of their gender, the prime influences behaviour of both men
and women in a similar manner. Also, consistent with the literature, I find no
significant difference in the Proposer behaviour.
The second chapter looks at the relationship between induced mood and
cooperative behaviour in a repeated interaction using the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
We find that players with an induced positive mood tend to cooperate less than
players in a neutral mood setting. This difference is highest in settings with an
uncertain number of repetitions and with no communication. We find that the
difference is driven by both less accurate beliefs about partners’ choices and a less
rational reaction to these beliefs among the players in the positive mood treatment.
This interpretation of the data is corroborated by a systematic analysis of the text
used during communication.
The third chapter looks at the idea of multiple motives in social dilemma,
using the Public Goods game and the Trust game. We look at the causal effect
of mood, risk and beliefs, and find that people in positive mood put in more effort
compared to people in neutral mood and perform better in the cognitive intelligence
test. However, we find that mood in presence of ambiguity is overpowered by beliefs
and decisions in public goods game and trust games are driven mostly by belief
rather than participant’s mood.
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Chapter 1
Gender Roles and Bargaining
Behaviour: A Lab Experiment
in Bangladesh
1.1 Introduction
The literature suggests there are systematic differences in behaviour driven by the
gender of an individual. In general, women are thought to be more pro-social and
having stronger other regarding preferences. One area of interest is differences in
bargaining behaviour. Bargaining has implications in our day to day life, from trad-
ing over goods and services, performing salary negotiations to acquiring better jobs
or promotions. Holm (2000) in his paper suggests that it is possible that women
and men are locked into a convention to discriminate women in some bargaining
situations. He also shows that information about the opponents gender seemed to
be used as a coordination signal and affects economic behaviour in a statistically
significant way towards discrimination of women. Different mechanisms have been
proposed that can potentially explain gender differences in bargaining behaviour.
Notable examples include differences in competitiveness, risk preferences and social
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preferences, among others (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Several studies have specifi-
cally examined gender differences in bargaining behaviour in the laboratory- but the
evidence is mixed.1 One can argue that some of the documented gender differences
are results of methodological differences in the studies (Sutter et al., 2009).
A different view is to suggest that differences in norms associated with gender
roles can explain such differences in decisions.2 However, it is difficult to provide
evidence that behaviour is driven by norms identity without controlling for the
specific norm, especially with non-experimental data. This paper uses a novel ex-
periment design to test if gender differences can be explained by the Social Role
Theory (SRT) which essentially says that, men and women behave differently in
social situations and take different roles, due to the expectations that society puts
upon them (Eagly et al., 2000). The main idea is that in an interactive context,
decisions may be influenced by information about features of the other player. In a
similar paper Benjamin et al. (2007) use the idea of self-categorization theory where
environmental cues called primes can temporarily make a certain social category
more salient, causing a persons behaviour to tilt more toward the norms associated
with the salient category. The marginal effect of a particular category in behaviour
can be observed by experimentally varying the salience of that category. In this pa-
per I make expectations about gender roles salient to see if that generates differences
in behaviour.
The idea of framing has been used by other researches to exogenously ma-
nipulate the information structure to generate a specific framing effect.3 One can
think of social identity- formed from symbols, etiquette, rituals, dress codes and
1For example, Garc´ıa-Gallego et al. (2012) find that women make lower offers as proposers;
whereas Eckel and Grossman (2008) find women are more generous than men; Saad and Gill (2001)
show that women are more generous against women and make more equal offers.
2Gender role is a type of social role and can be defined as a set of expectations associated with
the perception of masculinity and femininity. Gender norms can be identified as the prescriptions
of gender roles. It is a type of socio-cultural regulation (to encourage socially desirable behaviour).
This is a “pattern” of what individuals - as members of a group, or representing a particular social
position should do, what is required of them under given circumstances.
3See for example, Marchetti et al. (2011) and Kray and Thompson (2004)
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segregation to impress on people the notion that certain individuals constituted sig-
nificantly different categories and were subject to different constraints, to generate
framing effects. In some ways this experiment design lends itself to comparisons
to real world interactions. Although, it may seem odd to generate gender based
expectations artificially, a closer look at most of our social interactions reveals this
practice is commonly found- we are reminded of our gender identity in almost ev-
erything we do or say. Stereotypes like women are not as strong as men, women
are bad in mathematics and science related subjects, women are never in charge or
statements like real men don’t cry, men are in charge are statements we hear from a
very early age. Of course there are differences in degrees to which a society actually
represents such differences in roles, but the knowledge of such gender based identity
is present everywhere.
It is often conjectured in the literature that a lot of the gender difference is
culture driven and that these differences are more pronounced in developing coun-
tries compared to developed countries. One possible explanation for this discrepancy
could be different perceptions or expectations associated with specific gender roles
and the extent to which such gender roles and norms are pronounced in the society.
The experiments in this paper are run in Bangladesh, a model developing country
according to World Bank reports, where in spite of strong female participation in
labour force, perceptions on gender roles are extremely biased.4
In recent years there has been a lot of research on Bangladesh but most of
these are concentrated on the ready-made garments RMG sector or micro-credit
programmes. Some studies have been done on social preferences but on the rural
population. There is limited focus on the student body. With a population of 160
million and a median age of 22, Bangladesh hosts a very young population. It is
essential to understand the psyche of this age group in general, and especially on the
crucial issue of gender equality and gender norms. The existing survey data presents
4Evidence presented from World Values Survey data in next section
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an incomplete picture as they do not reveal perceptions for bargaining behaviour,
nor are they focused on the student body, which is the focal point for this study. This
strengthens the need to conduct an experiment in Bangladesh to provide evidence
about gender differences in bargaining behaviour. To my knowledge, this is the first
lab experiment to be done in Bangladesh with the students. In the future similar
studies can be done to get a more general idea about gender roles and differences in
behaviour.
I use a two person ultimatum game (UG) to observe bargaining behaviour
among 222 university students in a laboratory experiment in Bangladesh. Subjects
are randomly assigned to a control or treatment session where in the latter subjects
read a 150 word paragraph about how preferences of individuals are heterogeneous
and depends on a number of factors including gender. The purpose of the paragraph
is to make differences in gender roles salient. Subjects in the treatment sessions read
the paragraph, while subjects in control session wait 60 seconds before playing a one
shot UG.
The main finding is that in the session where subjects were primed, both
men and women responders ask for a lower Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO)
when they are partnered with a male proposer, after controlling for personality
traits, intelligence and risk preferences. The framing effect is such that subjects
expect men to be less generous and lower their expectations. Regardless of their
gender, the prime influences behaviour of both men and women in a similar manner
and overpowers their initial perception (if any) about gender roles. Also, consistent
with the literature, I find no significant difference in the proposer behaviour.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing an alternate
explanation to the observed gender differences in behaviour using the idea of social
role theory. Furthermore, it adds to the very limited literature on lab experiments
in developing world, since majority are conducted in the developed countries. Also,
it allows for replication, similar studies can be conducted in Bangladesh and other
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developing countries in the future.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 1.2 provides a brief
review of literature, the experiment design in presented in section 1.3, followed by
the main results and discussions in section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The UG has been used as a tool to measure bargaining behaviour ever since the
first experiment by Gu¨th et al. (1982). In the simplest form it is a two person game
where player 1 (henceforth proposer) offers a certain amount of money to player
2 (henceforth responder). In the second stage the responder can accept the offer-
in which case both players get the amount offered by the proposer, or reject- in
which case both players get zero. Game theoretic predictions would indicate that
responder accept any positive amount and anticipating this the proposer to offer the
smallest amount possible. However, subjects do not play like this in the laboratory.
The motivations behind decisions in the ultimatum game are diverse. According to
Gu¨th and Kocher (2014) the results from ultimatum experiments reject the narrow
orthodox assumption of material opportunism, but they do not necessarily reject
rationality in a broader sense, allowing for all sorts of aversion concepts, intrinsic
motivations, other-regarding preferences, and emotions. As a consequence, there is
much room for research from different perspectives.
There are different variations of this simple game, for example the game can
be extended to multiple players; and decision structure can be made simultaneous
instead of sequential. In the simultaneous case, known as strategy method, the
decision of proposer and responder is recorded simultaneously, where the proposer
makes and offer and the responder states a minimum acceptable offer (MAO), in-
stead of a simple yes or no to the offer. The experimenter then matches the offer
with the MAO. In a meta analysis study, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) show that on av-
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erage the proposer offers 40% of the total amount to the responder. When subjects
are relatively inexperienced or strategy method is used, this share is typically larger.
As the results come from different countries, meta-analysis provides an alternative
way to investigate whether bargaining behaviour in ultimatum games differs across
countries and the authors find differences in behaviour of responders (and not of
proposers) across geographical regions.
There is substantial evidence of gender differences in preferences, as reviewed
in Croson and Gneezy (2009). The authors review gender differences across risk pref-
erences, social preferences and attitude to competition. The main findings suggest
that women are more risk averse than men. The authors suggest this can be ex-
plained by the difference in affective reaction to risk, men and women differ in their
emotional reaction to uncertain situations and this differential emotional reaction
results in differences in risk taking. Men are also more confident than women and, as
a result, may have a different perception of the probability distribution underlying
a given risk. Men also tend to view risky situations as challenges, as opposed to
threats, which leads to increased risk tolerance. They also show evidence that these
differences are narrowed down by experience and profession. For example, studies
with managers and entrepreneurs find no gender differences in risk preferences. With
regards to social preferences, or other regarding preferences many of the results are
contradictory. In some experiments, women are more altruistic, inequality averse,
reciprocal, and cooperative than men, and in others they are less so. Croson and
Gneezy (2009) suggest the source of these conflicting results may be because women
are more sensitive to cues in the experimental context than are men. Finally on
attitude towards competitive behaviour they conclude that women are more averse
to competition than men and argue that along with nature, societal structure is also
crucially linked to the observed gender differences in competitiveness. In this paper
I test if men and women react differently to the prime, and find that both men and
women are sensitive to the prime and there is no significant difference in how they
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act on this information.
A seminal paper on gender differences in competitive behaviour is by Gneezy
et al. (2003) where they find that women are less effective than men in competitive
environments. The study involves changing the level of competitiveness in a lab-
oratory experiment, from a piece rate to a tournament environment. The authors
find a significant increase in performance for men, but not for women. This results
in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments, while there is no gap
when participants are paid according to piece rate. One possible explanation for
this is that a man and a woman of equal ability have different expectations about
their relative ability within the set of their competitors so they behave differently.
Another interesting result in this paper is that this effect (difference in performance)
is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single-sex competitive
environments. This implies that expectations play a crucial role not only in how
we perceive others, but also how we perceive ourselves, and this understanding or
perception seems to be context dependent.
A very relevant paper is by Sutter et al. (2009) who conduct an experimental
study to examine the importance of gender pairing for bargaining behaviour. They
use the power-to-take game, which is essentially a two person bargaining game that
relates to a typical principle-agent relationship. The analysis involves looking at the
four possible combinations of gender in this two-person bargaining game. They find
that gender per se has no significant effect on behaviour, but that gender pairing
has a strong influence. In particular, they observe much more competition and
retaliation when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have
the opposite gender. In this paper I also find gender pairing has a very significant
effect. In a similar paper Solnick (2001) uses an UG to examine gender differences
in bargaining behaviour. In the treatment sessions the gender of the partner is
revealed, whereas, anonymity is maintained in the control settings. The author
finds that men and women both make lower offers to women. As responders, both
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men and women choose higher MAO when the proposer is female. She explains this
may be because people believe that women will accept a smaller amount than men
will. The findings in this paper are consistent with Solnick’s view in that female
proposers attract higher MAO compared to a male proposer.
A different approach in explaining gender differences is that differences in
norms tied to gender roles help explain behavioural differences in economic out-
comes. Marchetti et al. (2011) examines the impact of information about the pro-
poser on the responders decision in a 2 person UG. The study varies the information
for different treatments with either no information, physical description or psycho-
logical description. Their results show that acceptance rates are significantly influ-
enced by both fairness of offers as well as the type of description. It seems that the
description provided of the proposer as being either selfish or generous generate a
framing effect- that the description of a partner as selfish has raised the bar for the
norm of fairness from this partner, suggesting that an offer has to be even more fair
to be recognized as such by the responder. These results support the relevance of
the expectation effects due to the framing in social decision making.
Kray and Thompson (2004) explains the theoretical idea negotiating partner
based gender differences which posits that men and women do not differ fundamen-
tally, but rather their negotiating partners hold different expectations about men
and women that lead them to be treated differently, which in turn affects processes
and outcomes. In short, men and women behave differently during bargaining as
a result of the behaviour of their opponent. This paper uses similar methods of
assessment, where specific expectations attached to gender roles are generated by
priming the subjects.
1.2.1 Bangladesh: some empirical evidence
It is often conjectured in the literature that a lot of the gender difference is culture
driven, meaning there is more pronounced gender difference in developing countries
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than in developed countries. The rationale behind is that differences in gender role
identity are more pronounced in developing world, owing to a wider gender gap.
It is my submission that Bangladesh presents an interesting case study. On one
hand World Bank (WB) reports indicate Bangladesh to be a model country as per
social indicators. Even though it is a predominantly Muslim country and in spite of
the patriarchal nature of the society, female participation in the work force is high
compared to other Muslim or developing countries and the trajectory is upwards
indicating that a greater number of women will eventually be in paid employment.
Thanks to the micro credit revolution, a higher number of women are working
from home growing vegetables or engaging in farm activities. The garments sector,
which is by far the highest source of foreign currency earnings, is largely reliant on
the female work force. Ratio of girls in secondary school is higher than boys and
the percentage of girls passing secondary school examination with higher merit has
already surpassed boys indicative of future employability. Bangladesh is also one
of the only developing countries to feature a woman as current Prime minister, the
leader of the opposition party and speaker of the parliament.
While the number of female managers is on the rise, it is not on an equal level.
Also, there still exists very strong perceptions of gender roles. The World Values
Survey (WVS) collects survey data to capture changing values and their impact on
social and political life around the world. Table 1.1 presents the data from the WVS
for Bangladesh (2002) on two questions based on gender perception. The questions
are: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” and
“On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”. Survey respon-
dents answer to either agree or disagree to the above statements. Remarkably, more
than majority of men and women believe men make better leaders and that they
deserve more priority when jobs are scarce. This suggests a strong built preference
for some roles to be filled by men compared to women. For comparison the data
from the 2005 wave in UK is also shown. A reason why the percentages are so high
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could be because the data is quite old and does not take in to account the current
mind set of people. The latest data wave from Bangladesh has not been published
yet. Also the survey data sample consists of the entire population from Bangladesh,
including rural areas where the gender perceptions maybe more biased. Finally rel-
evant for this study, the above questions do not reveal perceptions for bargaining
behaviour, which is the focal point for this study. This strengthens the need to
conduct an experiment in Bangladesh to provide evidence about gender differences
in bargaining behaviour.
This main contribution of this paper is two-fold. It gives an alternate expla-
nation to the observed gender differences and explains it by using the idea of social
role theory. Secondly, it adds to the very limited literature on developing world,
since majority of lab experiments are conducted in the developed countries. Also, it
allows for replication, similar studies to be conducted in Bangladesh in the future.
1.3 Experimental Design
In this study I use an UG game to examine bargaining behaviour and norm ex-
pectations are generated by the use of priming. The details of each part is given
below.
1.3.1 The Game
I use a simple two person UG to examine bargaining behaviour. The game tree in
shown in figure 1.1. In this game the proposer has the option to send any amount
between 0 to 500 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) to the second player, who can either
accept it or reject it. Participants play with real money where BDT 500 is approx-
imately equal to GBP 5. This is a substantial amount as the maximum wage a
student can earn in an hour is less that BDT 300. I use a simultaneous method,
where the responder (player 2) states a Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO) instead
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of responding to a specific amount. If the responder’s MAO is less than or equal
to the proposer’s offer, both get the amount proposed by the proposer; if MAO is
more than the offer, both get zero.
1.3.2 The Treatment
I use a simple treatment to see the effect of role expectations on behaviour. The
subjects in the treatment sessions read the following 150 words paragraph to make
gender difference salient.
Decades of research in experimental economics has shown that preferences
of individuals and their economic behaviour are quite heterogeneous. The literature
has attempted to explain this heterogeneity due to different factors such as age,
educational background, cultural differences, income levels and social status, among
others. One of the most important factors that has been analyzed thoroughly is the
role of gender in economic behaviour.Recent surveys which review the literature on
gender differences in experimental economics have found that, women tend be more
generous and demonstrate a fairer approach towards distribution of wealth when
compared to men of similar background. For example, authors Guth, Schimdt and
Sutter (2007) find that female participants are significantly more likely to offer equal
splits of a pie or sum of money than are men, and suggest this is because women
are averse to the idea of inequality.
In the control sessions there was no prime. A neutral paragraph was not used,
as the main purpose was to see the effect of the above paragraph on the subject’s
decision. It is possible that a neutral paragraph may have generated some other bias
that the experimenter could not control. As no subject participated in both control
and treatment sessions, it was expected that there would not be any possibility of
contamination. As a placebo, subjects were made to wait for 60 seconds before
proceeding to play the game. It is estimated that on average people can read 3
words per second, which would mean it would take a subject on average 50 seconds
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to read a 150 word paragraph, which is the length of the paragraph that subjects
read in the treatment sessions.
1.3.3 Questionnaire
After completion of the UG game, subjects solved the Raven Progressive Matrices
(RPM) test which included 30 visual puzzles (Raven et al., 2003). Participants
were allowed 30 seconds for each puzzle to be completed, as it is pretty standard
in the literature. As a non-monetary incentive, subjects were told they will receive
their scores from the raven at the end of the experiment. After completion of the
tasks the participants were asked to fill out a simple questionnaire. The form in-
cluded questions on personal information such as their age, current degree course,
current semester of study, medium of instruction in high school(english or bengali),
exam mode (S.S.C/ H.S.C or GCSEs) familiarity with other participants in the lab,
relationship status and life satisfaction. A 30-item DOSPERT questionnaire was
asked to elicit risk preferences of participants following (Blais and Weber, 2006).
The DOSPERT questionnaire has 6 questions from 5 different risk domains: finan-
cial, ethical, social, recreational and health and safety. The 44 item inventory that
measures an individual on the Big Five Factors of personality is also used to elicit
personality measures (John and Srivastava, 1999).
1.3.4 Implementation
The study was conducted in a private university in Bangladesh. The students were
recruited using university notice boards and email invitations. Appendix A shows
a sample poster used for recruitment. A contact information was given in the ad-
vertisement and interested participants were asked to either email the experimenter
or sign in using an online google form. The experimenter then confirmed participa-
tion and subjects were notified via email/ text about their participation date and
time. This process was followed to ensure equal participation of men and women
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in the study, but the subjects were not informed about this. All of the subjects
are from Bangladesh and the names are very gender specific, so it was possible to
infer the gender of the participant from their name. A full list of experiment dates
is available in the appendix B. Each session was designed so that the number of
participants did not exceed 20. A computer laboratory in the university was booked
for the experiment dates and converted to be a suitable experimental lab. A picture
of one of the sessions is available in the appendix C. Once the students came to the
lab they were randomly assigned an id number attached to a single computer. The
experiment was conducted using the software z-tree Fischbacher (2007). In total
222 students participated over 12 sessions, each session lasted about an hour. There
were 108 subjects in control sessions and 114 subjects in treatment sessions. On
average each participant earned BDT 415 (approx GBP 4), with a show up fee of
BDT 250. This is a substantial amount as the student can earn up to BDT 300
for an hour as a Teaching assistant at the university. The sequence was the same
in both conditions, only difference was that participants in the treatment condition
were asked to read the paragraph.
1.4 Results and Discussions
In this section, I will present the results of this study. I will refer to the sessions
without any priming as control sessions and the sessions with the prime (paragraph)
will be called treatment sessions. In all sessions gender about the other person was
revealed in a simple sentence which said ”You have been assigned the role of Pro-
poser (Responder), you are partnered with a Male (Female) Responder (Proposer).
I begin with table 1.2 which shows differences in mean for major variables across the
treatment. For all differences independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare
the characteristics in the control sessions and the treatment session. The differences
are not significant so we can say the sample in the control and treatment sessions
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were not significantly different across major individual characteristics.5 The aver-
age age in the sample was about 20 years. There is a slight difference in the raven
score, where subjects in the treatment sessions have on average 1.306 points more
than subjects in control sessions. I carried independent tests on raven score to see
if it affects the offers made in the UG, but there was no effect. There is no reason
to think that subjects in the control session will systematically have higher raven
score, this is a small difference which I suspect is due to randomisation. The two
groups are similar in terms of personality traits and risk preferences. On average
profits from the UG game was about BDT 171. Appendix E shows the histogram
of offers made by Proposers and minimum acceptable offers made by Responders.
As expected, the distributions are almost bell shaped, with some peaks at the edges
and the highest peaks at the median.
1.4.1 Proposer Behaviour
First we look at the effect of treatment on proposer behaviour. An independent-
samples t-test was conducted to compare proposer offers in control and treatment
conditions. There was no significant difference in the offers for control (M=265.81,
sd=84.51) and treatment (M=253.47, sd=116.74) conditions, p = 0.5268.6 These
results suggest that the prime does not have an effect on proposer behaviour.
I further split the samples according to subject’s own gender and gender of
partner. Independent samples t-test reveals no significant difference. Overall offer
amounts are lower in the treatment sessions, but this difference is not significant.
There is a larger difference in offers made by women compared to offers made by
men, between control and treatment sessions. This result is consistent with previ-
ous findings in Croson and Gneezy (2009), who show that women are more sensitive
to difference in contextual cues compared to men. I present the results in figure
5All tests were replicated using Mann-Whitney U test and the results were consistent with the
findings of ttest
6The results obtained from Mann-Whitney U test are similar, p-value=0.587
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1.2, which splits the sample by the proposer’s own gender. There is no difference
between offers made by male subjects in the two treatments, for females the differ-
ence is 28.7 BDT (p-value 0.3000) The bars show errors at 95% confidence interval.
Figure 1.3 shows the results split by the partner’s gender. Here we can see highest
offers are made to male partners (responders) in the control session (M=275.88). Fe-
male responders attract lower offers in control (M=255.74) and treatment sessions
(259.32), and this is similar to offers made to male responders in the treatment
condition (M=250.24). Although the differences are not significant, an interesting
pattern seems to emerge. If we look at the behaviour in the control condition, there
is a larger gap between offers made to men and women, where men attract higher
offer (difference of approx 20 BDT). However, this difference comes down to only
9 BDT and the direction is reversed in the treatment condition. Women attract
higher offer. The prime seem to generate expectations of gender equality.
Finally in figure 1.4 I show the average proposer offer according to four
possible gender pairing: MM MF FM and FF. The first letter corresponds to the
gender of the proposer and the second letter shows the gender of the responder.
The average offers are higher for mixed genders (MF and FM). The offers are lowest
for all female pairs. The pattern is consistent with the literature that shows men
attract higher offers (Solnick, 2001) and members of one’s own sex are the primary
competitors, so they offer least (Sutter et al., 2009).
1.4.2 Responder Behaviour
I will carry out similar analysis for the responder MAO. This is also a continuous
variable between 0 to 500 BDT. The independent-samples t-test was conducted to
compare MAO under control and treatment conditions. There is a significant differ-
ence in the responder MAO for control (M=267.3704, SD=131.4741) and treatment
(M=227.2456, SD=118.8116) conditions; p = 0.0471. These results suggest that the
prime really does have an effect on responder MAO. Specifically, the results suggest
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that when individuals are primed, responder MAO falls significantly. So, responders
lower their expectations and as such lower their asking MAO. To understand what
expectations within the treatment is driving the results I split the sample according
to the responder gender and their partner (proposer’s) gender. Overall across all
four categories MAO is lower in treatment condition compared to control condition.
Both male and female responders update their expectations and reduce their MAO
after the prime. There is no gender difference in responder MAO. However, further
examination reveals that the fall in MAO in the treatment session is driven by one
crucial factor, the gender of the partner. If the partner (proposer) is male, then
the responder MAO is significantly lower. The difference is quite substantial (54.95
BDT) and is significant at 5%.
Figure 1.5 shows the average offers made by both males and females is lower
in the treatment condition. In figure 1.6 when we split the sample by partner’s
gender, two important facts are revealed. The MAO is significantly different and
lower for male partners (proposers) compared to control condition, and also there is
a significant difference between offers made to the female and male partners within
the treatment condition. This is very interesting as it suggests there is a very clear
and singular direction in which the prime acts. This difference cannot be explained
by any other factor. The only thing driving the result is the prime.
Figure 1.7 shows average responder MAO according to four possible gender
pairing: MM MF FM and FF. The first letter corresponds to the gender of the
responder and the second letter shows the gender of the proposer (note the gender
notation is opposite to what was shown in figure 1.4). The most obvious result is
that both men and women ask for a significant lower MAO when the proposer is
male. The other offers are somewhat similar. In the next section I look in to the
results to better understand the causality of this effect.
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Regression Analysis
I use a simple regression analysis to show the causal effect of the treatment on
responder MAO. In table 1.5 model 1, the effect of treatment variable is shown on
the MAO, controlling for individual characteristics such as risk aversion, raven score,
big 5 personality factors and their medium of schooling. In model 1, the significant
effect is the treatment, which has a negative effect on the responder MAO. This
means the treatment condition makes individuals ask for a lower MAO. In model
2, when the variable female is added, the treatment variable is still significant. The
sign of variable female is negative which indicates female responders ask for lower
MAO compared to make responder but this difference is not significant. In column
3, I add the variable partner’s gender which is equal to 1 if the partner is female.
This effect is positive and significant. So compared to male partners, female partners
attract higher MAO. In model 4, I add the interaction terms treatment with gender
and treatment with partner’s gender. The sign of the effects are still consistent but
the significance is lost. This is possibly due to loss in power in the model or the
effects cancel each other as they are going in opposite direction. The main result
is that the only significant effect is that of the prime, there is no gender difference
otherwise. There is also no difference in how men and women react to the prime,
both genders update the expectations and ask for a lower MAO from the male
partners. The prime seems to generate the expectations that men are more selfish
compared to women and so the asking MAO is significantly lower for men.
A brief summary of results: Firstly I find no significant gender difference in
the offers made, either by proposer or responder. This may be surprising as one
would expect there to be gender differences in preferences in a developing country
like Bangladesh. One possible explanation could be that the subjects in the study
are all young, undergraduate students. Regardless of their socio-economic back-
ground they are all part of a community which encourages equal participation by
men and women. They have been exposed to higher education and are not rep-
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resentative of the general population, who is perceived to be more gender biased.
Another possibility is that I find no gender differences due to cultural norm. May
be the general population is more generous overall, and there is no expectation that
women are or should be more generous. It is only when the specific expectation
about bargaining behaviour is generated, I find some difference. Moreover, I find
no difference in the way the prime affects men and women. It is not the case that
women are more susceptible to the prime than men are as suggested by Croson and
Gneezy (2009). This could be an issue of self selection by the women in the study.
A possible solution would be to check if the beliefs formed are different for men and
women, but this is a limitation of the study as I do not elicit belief. Finally, the
results suggest that the prime is the only element driving the difference in respon-
der MAO, so this is a clear treatment effect. The crucial part in the paragraph said
”women tend be more generous and demonstrate a fairer approach towards distribu-
tion of wealth when compared to men of similar background. For example, authors
Guth, Schimdt and Sutter (2007) find that female participants are significantly more
likely to offer equal splits of a pie or sum of money than are men, and suggest this
is because women are averse to the idea of inequality. Although the prime contains
information about women’s behaviour, the direction of the effect seem to work to-
wards men, subjects lower their MAO towards men in anticipation that men are not
as generous as women.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper I use an UG to test gender differences in bargaining behaviour. I use
the method of priming to generate gender specific expectations. Participants read
a paragraph about gender differences in behaviour, the expectation is reading this
would make their gender identity salient and also generate certain gender specific
expectations, such as women are more generous than men in bargaining scenarios.
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The main result suggests that the prime changes behaviour of both men and
women in the responder role where both genders ask for a lower MAO when they
are partnered with a male, after controlling for personality traits, intelligence and
risk preferences. There is no difference in how men and women react to the prime.
Also, I find no significant difference in proposer behaviour, consistent with existing
literature.
The main contribution of this paper is that it is the first lab experiment
in Bangladesh to be done with students. This adds to the current almost non-
existent literature on the psyche of the youth, that too of such a young population
country like Bangladesh. This paper opens up the possibility of replication in similar
universities in Bangladesh and other developing countries. This paper also adds to
the current literature on gender differences in bargaining behaviours, which is mostly
comprised of studies done in developed countries.
There are a few limitations of this paper. It would be interesting to use a dif-
ferent method to generate gender norm expectations, instead of asking participants
to read a paragraph. A criticism can be that this generates demand effects, where
the subjects only show difference because the they suspect what the experimenter
expects to see. I cannot completely rule out the possibility of some demand effect,
but by that same logic I should also see difference in proposer behaviour, which does
not seem to happen in this case. Also, it would be interesting to get information on
individual’s belief, that would allow to shed some light on how the prime works. It
would also be interesting to do a similar study in a developed country like UK, to
see if the results are consistent.
This paper can have huge policy implications. The main argument here is
that fundamentally men and women are not different but they behave differently
due to the expectations that society puts on them. If this is true, then the poli-
cies targeting gender equality has to focus more on setting unbiased expectations
on gender roles. For example, women empowerment cannot fully be achieved by
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only targeting one gender. Merely asking women to get financially independent and
securing equal opportunity for jobs is only half the picture. Such a system still puts
the onus of household chores on women. While girls are asked to help in the kitchen
or set up table for dinner, boys are more likely to help out with outward activities.
Ideally policies should be designed to reduce the existing gender role identification
and stereotypes. May be men should be encouraged to be more involved with house-
hold activities and raising a family. If gender differences are driven by perceptions
and expectations about each gender, an obvious first step is to address such biases
in expectations to ensure gender equality.
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Table 1.1: Gender perceptions based on WVS
Item Bangladesh (2002) UK (2005)
Male Female Male Female
Job Scarce 75.8% 56.3% 17.8% 14.0%
Political Leader 66.3% 63.5% 23.3% 12.7%
Figure 1.1: The game tree
Proposer
Responder
x = 500x = 0
N
0, 0
Y
500− x, x
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Table 1.2: Differences in mean across treatments
Variable Control Treatment Differences Std. dev N
Age 20.79 21 -0.203 1.28 222
Raven 10.33 11.7 -1.368* 4.79 222
Extraversion 3.29 3.29 .003 .71 222
Agreeableness 3.86 3.86 -.002 .47 222
Conscientiousness 3.47 3.46 .015 .609 222
Neuroticism 3.02 3.01 .009 .768 222
Openness 3.73 3.81 -.074 .442 222
Risk aversion .57 .56 .003 .096 222
Profit 166.67 175.43 -8.77 141.93 222
Table 1.3: Differences in mean proposer offer
Variable Control Treatment Differences Std. dev N
Proposer Offer 265.81 253.47 12.34 102.06 111
Male 269.27 266.14 3.12 103.97 56
Female 263.43 234.73 28.69 100.39 55
Male Partner 275.88 250.24 25.64 102.02 64
Female Partner 255.74 259.31 -3.71 103.18 47
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Figure 1.2: The average Proposer offer, split by gender
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Figure 1.3: The average Proposer offer, split by partner’s gender
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Figure 1.4: The average Proposer offe, split by gender pairs
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Table 1.4: Differences in mean responder MAO
Variable Control Treatment Differences Std. dev N
Responder MAO 267.37 227.24 40.12** 126.17 111
Male 266.34 223.78 42.56 125.11 55
Female 268.86 229.58 39.27 128.31 56
Male Partner 261.62 206.67 54.95** 126.62 64
Female Partner 273.11 265.3 7.81 123.17 47
Figure 1.5: The average Responder MAO, split by gender
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Figure 1.6: The average Responder MAO, split by partner’s gender
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Figure 1.7: The average Responder MAO, split by gender pairs
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Table 1.5: Regression estimation for responder MAO
Dependent variable is log of responder MAO. Standard Errors are clustered at the
session levels; ∗ p− value < 0.1, ∗∗ p− value < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p− value < 0.01
MAO MAO MAO MAO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Treatment –0.27155* –0.26129* –0.19822 –0.21190
(0.1483) (0.1550) (0.1538) (0.2363)
Female –0.04072 –0.10898 –0.08562
(0.1693) (0.1679) (0.2266)
Female Partner 0.36804** 0.31446
(0.1543) (0.2153)
Treatment x Female –0.06390
(0.3055)
Treatment x Female Partner 0.11700
(0.3061)
Risk Aversion –0.10323 –0.08435 –0.28810 –0.29302
(0.8595) (0.8671) (0.8516) (0.8604)
Raven 0.05692 0.03006 0.11941 0.11273
(0.3453) (0.3645) (0.3581) (0.3627)
Openness 0.49053 0.52128 0.48239 0.49291
(0.4845) (0.5033) (0.4920) (0.4979)
Conscientiousness –0.26740 –0.25714 –0.36074 –0.34330
(0.3712) (0.3754) (0.3694) (0.3755)
Extraversion 0.48288 0.48403 0.42708 0.40789
(0.4354) (0.4375) (0.4281) (0.4402)
Agreeableness –0.11866 –0.11252 0.10780 0.11908
(0.5785) (0.5818) (0.5760) (0.5852)
Neuroticism 0.28515 0.31214 0.34500 0.34956
(0.3975) (0.4149) (0.4056) (0.4116)
English School 0.13836 0.15212 0.21627 0.21597
(0.1806) (0.1902) (0.1878) (0.1896)
N 110 110 110 110
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Chapter 2
Cooperation and Positive Mood
in Repeated Interactions
2.1 Introduction
The vast majority of exercises we, as social beings, engage in requires assistance,
help, collaboration; in other words some form of cooperation. The paramount im-
portance of cooperation, its determinants and its applications have warranted a
plethora of academic literature, especially in the field of economics. Game theory
has proven to be a significant tool for both normative and descriptive research on
collective action problems, especially on the importance of cooperation. One of the
most common tools used for measuring cooperation is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game, which is essentially a two-person game which represents conflict between in-
dividual and collective interests. Embrey et al. (2015) and Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette
(2014) provide excellent surveys on determinants of cooperation in finitely repeated
and infinitely repeated PD games, respectively. The evidence from field and lab
shows a lot of heterogeneity in the results, even after controlling for experience in
the repeated games, indicating that perhaps the heterogeneity in behaviour is due
to differences in individual characteristics. Notable examples include, Croson and
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Gneezy (2009); Davis et al. (2016) who explore the relation between gender and
cooperation; Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) investigate differences in indi-
vidual risk preference and Dal Bo´ (2005) investigates subject’s choice of degree. In a
recent paper Proto et al. (2014) have shown cooperation to be related to individual
differences in intelligence.
One possible source of heterogeneity may be differences in mood or feeling
states of subjects, implying that humans often make different decisions depending on
their current feeling state. In the last 40 years, the management literature has largely
emphasized the importance of an organizational model integrating employees’ affect,
something that has been defined “affective revolution” (see e.g. Barsade and Donald
E. Gibson 2007). This notion is more generally reflected in the work of psychologists
and neuroscientists (e.g. Damasio (1994); Ralph and Damasio (2000); Forgas (2002);
Fischer et al. (2008)), who have provided a wealth of evidence that mood and, more
generally, emotions are an essential and adaptive component of social behaviour.1
A central question in the management literature is the specific effect of good mood
on performances, several contribution have emphasized how individuals with more
disposition to positive mood are also better performers in different tasks.
Recently Oswald et al. (2015) show that experimentally inducing positive
mood seems to invigorate individuals leading them to exert more effort in individual
tasks. The direct implication is that happiness is good for worker productivity and in
turn good for firms’ profits. However, many workplace tasks are not of the individual
one-shot decision-making variety but instead are likely to involve repetition, social
behaviour (including strategic interaction) and a degree of cooperation. Accordingly.
the question we address in this paper is the effect of positive mood (“happiness”)
on cooperation under repeated interactions, which allows us to contribute to this
growing debate on the effect of well-being on economic performance (productivity)
1Moods are emotional states, unlike emotions; they are relatively low-intensity, diffuse, and
enduring affective states that have no salient cause and little cognitive content (e.g., feeling good
or feeling bad, being in a happy or sad mood) (Forgas, 2002).
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in the workplace.
The repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma provides perhaps the most well-known
game that captures a fundamental tension in social interactions: the conflict be-
tween short-term losses and long term benefit of cooperation. It is not surprising
then that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is one of the most highly studied games in the
laboratory. However, laboratory-based evidence has emphasized that conventional
theory does not offer clear guidance, neither in finite setting – where cooperation
occurs despite backwards induction predicting otherwise (see Flood (1952) for the
seminal paper and Embrey et al. (2014) for a survey of the subsequent literature);
nor in an infinite repetition game – where neither subgame perfection nor risk dom-
inance provide a sufficient condition for cooperation (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011)
and Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2014) for a survey of the literature). Therefore, what
determines cooperation in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is still, to a large extent,
an unsolved puzzle.
According to the existing literature, the effect of positive mood on cooper-
ation seems to be rather complex. On one hand, empirical research suggests that
people experiencing positive mood are more assertive and inward oriented, use less
information and more stereotypes, and avoid demanding, systematic thinking (e.g.
Schwarz (2013) and Forgas (1998)). Proto et al. (2014) show that cognitive skills
heavily positively affect cooperation in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Putting
this all together we might hypothesize that positive emotion reduces systematic
thinking which in turn might reduce cooperation. We refer to this mechanism as
the “cognitive channel”.
In contrast, classic studies in psychology have shown that positive mood pro-
duces more open, altruistic and helpful behavior (e.g. Isen and Geva (1987)). These
latter are consistent with the more recent experimental economics studies investigat-
ing the effect of emotion in one-shot economic decisions that emphasize the impact
of emotion on social preferences, in the sense that individuals are more altruistic
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and trusting (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Capra, 2004; Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016;
Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Kessler et al., 2016).2 This leaves the question of how
mood should affect cooperation very much open. We refer to this mechanism as the
“social preferences channel”.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of induced mood on cooperative be-
haviour In our set-up, participants play different variants of the repeated PD. The
key treatment is whether participants face a positive or neutral mood induction
process;3. We replicate this key treatment under different conditions: (a) whether
participants are allowed to communicate by sending short text statements prior to
interaction; (b) whether participants play in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a
known end round (finite repetition) or whether this is indefinite (typically abbrevi-
ated to “infinite repetition” in the literature)
Our main finding suggest that the effect of induced positive mood is gener-
ally negative, in the sense that subjects in the positive mood treatment cooperate
less and play less efficiently than subjects in the neutral mood. In the finitely re-
peated treatment and in the treatment with communication, the effect of positive
mood is smaller and in the sessions with both communication and finitely repeated
interactions the effect disappears. This suggests that positive mood has a stronger
negative effect, the less information is available to player. Hence, arguably the effect
is stronger, the more complex the game. This interpretation of the data is corrobo-
rated by an analysis of the text used in the communication setting where individuals
in the good mood treatment seem to be more inward-oriented than individuals in
the neutral mood treatments. This first result is clearly more consistent with the
cognitive channel than with the social preferences channel. In other words, these
results clearly show that under repeated interactions, the results that individuals
2Other related contributions are Guiso et al. (2013); Lerner and Keltner (2001) on mood and
risk preferences; and Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014); Pyone and Isen (2011); Drichoutis and Nayga
(2013) on mood and time preferences.
3We describe this in detail later, but we note here that we used a combination of the well-known
“Velten mood induction process” and a music-based mood induction: see (Westermann et al., 1996).
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are more pro-social when in a good mood is dramatically reversed.
In order to gain more insights on the way the “cognitive channel” works, we
present a model where we measure subjects’ beliefs about partners’ choices before
they play the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. In this simple model, agents have some
given beliefs about their opponent’s strategies and chose their optimal strategies
by maximising their surpluses on the basis of these beliefs. We show that the
difference is driven by more accurate beliefs about partners’ choices and by choices
that are more consistent with a maximizing behaviour among participants in the
neutral mood treatments. There exists related work which has emphasized the
strong effect of intelligence in influencing strategic interaction (e.g. Gill and Prowse
(2016), Proto et al. (2014)) and the weak effect, especially in the long run, of other
characteristics (see Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2014) for an extensive survey). Our
results are related to this literature because they show that positive mood seems
to negatively affect individuals’ theory of mind and capacity to optimize, elements
that are clearly linked to cognitive skills. This is consistent with Hertel et al. (2000)
suggesting that mood affects the process of decision making in cooperative situations
(rather than affecting the level of cooperation), in particular they argue that under
positive mood there is more heuristic processing, whereas negative mood leads to
more systematic processing. More generally, our results lend some support to the
notion that emotions, at least in some instances, can lead to suboptimal decisions
(e.g. Baumeister et al. (2007), Frijda and Mesquita (1994)).4
The following section details our experimental design including an examina-
tion of the mood induction process and the various treatment differences. Section
4It is important to note the deviation of this discussion from traditional rational or irrational
behaviour in economics. According to Frank (1988), emotions act as a commitment device. As
one of the examiners commented For instance, the emotion of anger may be detrimental in one-
shot interactions if it leads to actions that are destructive of material resources (e.g. punishing
some offenders), but may be beneficial in the longer term if they become associated with a certain
reputation (e.g. the subject is not attacked because of his/reputation of vengeance). In other words,
the same behaviour may be seen as irrational in the short term but rational in the longer term. We
refrain from using the traditional meaning of the words rational or irrational behaviour, and focus
our anaylysis on what we call best responses dynamics and behaviour consistent with one’s beliefs,
explained in the later section.
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2.3 begins with a presentation of comparative statics across treatments. We then
present an examination of the basins of attraction surrounding the different strate-
gies as well as an examination of the accuracy of beliefs across treatments. The
section finishes with a text analysis of the content of communication between par-
ticipants during the relevant sessions. Section 2.5 concludes with a discussion of the
findings.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment in our study consisted of three parts. In the first part, we im-
plemented a mood induction process through which laboratory participants were
induced with either a positive mood or a neutral mood. In the second part, par-
ticipants played different versions of the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game. In the
final part, students answered a questionnaire which consisted of intelligence, de-
mographic, personality and risk preference questions. The experiment instructions,
including the questionnaire, are available in Appendix J. In what follows, we will
describe the different treatments, a summary table is available in the appendix F.
2.2.1 Mood Induction Procedures
In our study we use a combination of two different mood induction procedures (or
hereafter “MIPs”): the “Velten” MIP and a music-based MIP. Studies have found
that a combination of MIPs often have more impact than a single MIP (Va¨stfja¨ll,
2002). The Velten MIP is the most widely accepted and used form of MIP. In this
method subjects read a series of statements describing either positive self evaluations
or somatic statements. An example of a statement under the positive setting is: “If
your attitude is good, then things are good, and my attitude is good” (Velten,
1968). In the neutral state, participants are presented with trivial and factual
statements which carry no emotional load. For example, “The orient express travels
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between Paris and Istanbul”. A detailed list of all the statements used in the
experiment is available in Appendix N. In our experiment we used the 50 statement
version of the Velten MIP following Isen and Gorgoglione (1983). In the music MIP
subjects listened to a mood-suggestive piece of classical or modern music. In the
positive treatment we used the allegro from Mozart’s Eine Kleine Nacht Musik as
background music. For the neutral treatment, the music Aerial Boundaries from
Michael Hedges was used. These music pieces were chosen from a list of publications
that have successfully used the music MIP (Va¨stfja¨ll, 2002). Participants were
provided with headphones for this part of the experiment and did not know if
the other participants also read or listened to the same items. In our treatments
participants read the statements and listened to the music simultaneously. The
process lasted for approximately 6 minutes 45 seconds, with 7.5 seconds for reading
each statement.
2.2.2 The Game
Table A.1 shows the Prisoners’ Dilemma stage game used in our study, following
Embrey et al. (2014). The Prisoners’ Dilemma is perhaps the most studied game in
experimental economics and the most archetypal example of the cooperative problem
in modern economics. The unique Nash equilibrium, which coincides with the unique
dominance solvable outcome, is “Defect, Defect” offering a payoff of 39 to each
player. Any finite repetition will result in the same unique Nash equilibrium (and
dominance solvable outcome) which is a repetition of “Defect, Defect” in every stage
of the game through backwards induction from the final stage. An infinite repetition
allows a multitude of possible Nash equilibria through a well-known application of
the folk theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
We explicitly study two variants of the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma: a vari-
ant with a known end stage (the “finite” repetition treatment) where participants
play the game for exactly 11 rounds and this information is known; and a variant
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with an unknown end stage (the “infinite” repetition treatment) where participants
are told the game will be played for at least 10 rounds. In practice in the labora-
tory the unknown end stage treatment (unknown only from the perspective of the
participants) lasted for 12, 10 and 11 rounds in the three supergames.5 In total,
participants played in only one variant each (either with a known end date or not)
playing exactly three times with different partners each time (perfect strangers).
2.2.3 Pre-play Communication & Belief Elicitation
In some sessions (which we label the “chat” treatment hereafter) we allow partici-
pants the opportunity to engage in pre-play communication. Communication allows
participants to send signals about their type, strengthens identity among the group
and creates certain norms favouring cooperation (Balliet, 2010). In the “chat” treat-
ments, prior to playing each of the three repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma super-games,
participants were allowed to chat for 180 seconds with their partner. In the control
sessions, participants were not allowed to chat and waited for 60 seconds before
moving on to the next task.
In the sessions which we label “belief”, we elicit each participant’s belief
about the likelihood that their partner will choose to cooperate. This was incen-
tivised using a simple quadratic scoring rule. Specifically, the stated likelihood “R”
was entered into the following formula, where “r” denotes the realized action of the
partner. E is the experimental unit earned from belief elicitation. One randomly
chosen E was then multiplied by £2 and added to the participants earning.
E = 1− ( R
100
− r
100
)2
5The durations of 12, 10 and 11 in the treatment with an unknown end stage were set to give
an average of 11, leaving the average duration the same as in the known end stage treatment. No
participant took part in more than one treatment or session and so this relationship would not have
been derivable to participants.
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2.2.4 Questionnaire
After completion of the Prisoners’ Dilemma games, participants were asked to at-
tempt 30 visual puzzles from the Raven Progressive Matrices (RPM) test (Raven
et al., 2003). We allowed 30 seconds for each puzzle to be completed. Participants
were paid £1 each for three randomly-chosen answers if they proved to be correct.
Following the Raven test subjects completed a survey which included demographic
questions (see appendix J) for a detailed list). Next, a 30-item DOSPERT ques-
tionnaire was used to elicit the risk preferences of participants (Blais and Weber,
2006) and the “BIG Five Inventory” was used to measure the personality traits of
subjects following John and Srivastava (1999). Participants were also asked to recall
and assess how they felt after listening to the music at the beginning of the session
on a 5-point scale from “Not at all Happy” to “Very Happy”: such self-reports are
usually held to be a valid approach for the measurement of emotions (Robinson and
Clore, 2002). A full list of personality questions and risk questions are available in
appendix O and appendix P, respectively.
2.2.5 Implementation
Participants were recruited using the SONA online recruitment system at the Uni-
versity of Warwick and the sessions were conducted in a computerised lab equipped
to accommodate 20 subjects per session. Most participants were undergraduate and
postgraduate students at the university. We excluded economics students as previ-
ous studies have found them to behave more strategically in lab experiments (e.g
seeDal Bo´ (2005)). We also excluded participants with any prior knowledge of game
theory. In total, 552 students participated between June 2015 and June 2016 over
32 sessions, with 270 participants in the positive treatment and 282 in the neutral
treatment. Each session lasted for about 90 minutes and on average subjects earned
£17 including show up fee of £5. The experiment was implemented using Z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
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2.3 Results
The characteristics of the different groups in the different mood inductions is detailed
in table 2.2. The table indicates that participants in the positive mood treatment
recalled being in a significantly better mood than those in the neutral treatment
suggesting that our mood induction was successful. The other characteristics are
on average not significantly different. An exception is perhaps the Raven test that
seems to be higher on average in the session with neutral mood induction: we will
argue below that this is consistent with our hypothesis.
We begin with a comparison of rates of cooperation across treatments before
looking at best response dynamics (with reference to an analysis of basins of attrac-
tion), an examination of the accuracy of beliefs and an analysis of the text used in
pre-play communication.
2.3.1 Comparative Statics across Treatments
Figure 2.1 reveals our first and perhaps most surprising finding:
Result 2.3.1. Participants in the neutral mood treatment cooperate more than par-
ticipants in the positive mood treatment.
Notice also that because participants cooperate more they also earn more
in all treatments except for the finite variant of the Prisoners’ Dilemma with chat,
where the difference remains positive but is not significant, as we note from figure
2.3. This pattern is somewhat replicated in the sessions where we include belief-
elicitation: in figure 2.2 participants in the neutral mood treatments cooperate more
in the infinite variant of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, with chat and in the finite variant
without chat, while in the finite variant with chat the difference is smaller and the
inequality is actually reversed. Accordingly, from figure 2.4 we note that – even
in the sessions with beliefs – participants in the neutral mood condition earn more
except in the finite variant of the Prisoners’ Dilemma with chat.
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An interesting pattern we note from figures 2.1, 2.3, 2.2 and 2.4 is that the
differences between the sessions with different mood inductions are largest in the
treatment with an uncertain number of repetitions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (the
“infinite” treatment) without chat. Moreover the difference is very small in the finite
Prisoners’ Dilemma treatment with chat. This suggests that the role of mood, while
consistent across treatments, interacts strongly with both the inclusion of pre-play
communication and the duration of the repetition, which can both to some extent
over-ride the impact of mood. To summarize:
Result 2.3.2. Adding uncertainty to the number of repetitions reduces the difference
in the level of cooperation between mood treatments.
Result 2.3.3. Adding pre-play communication reduces the difference in the level of
cooperation between mood treatments.
Finally we note the following:
Result 2.3.4. The inclusion of pre-play communication increases the propensity to
cooperate.
This result is consistent with the existing literature on cooperation absent
the inclusion of mood, for instance see (Embrey et al., 2015).
2.3.2 Best Response Dynamics and Basins of Attraction
Subgame perfection is of limited value (especially in the finite setting where the
only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is to always defect). Moreover, we know
(from the results in this paper and those of countless others summarized in Embrey
et al. (2014) and Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2014)) that cooperation occurs even in a
finite setting especially early in the life of any supergame. One way to consider how
players might make sensible decisions when they are aware that cooperation is a
possibility is to think in terms of which strategy might result in the highest payoff
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conditional on the parameters of the game and beliefs about the probability that
the rival player will play in a cooperative way. Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011) provide
the method we need by thinking in terms of basins of attraction. In short, the idea
is to assume only two extreme strategies: a “grim” strategy and an always defect
strategy. The “grim” strategy is defined as a strategy in which a player initially
opts to cooperate but always defects after a single instance of defect by the other
player. The “always defect” strategy simply involves playing defect in all periods
irrespective of the actions of the other player. Assuming these are the only strategies
considered, the basin of attraction is the set of beliefs (on the actions of the other
player) for which a particular strategy is optimal. Appendix H provides full details
for the computation of the basins of attraction.
In figure 2.5, we observe the dynamics of the cooperation rates in the dif-
ferent treatments and in the different supergames. In the treatment without chat
we observe a declining pattern in cooperation, in the sessions with pre-play com-
munication cooperation seems to be constant, apart from the end of game effect in
the “finite” setting with chat (the bottom-right panel). The diamonds represent the
basin of attraction of always defecting in rounds 1 of each supergame, as defined by
Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011). From figure 2.5 we note that the share of individuals
cooperating in the first rounds are well above the threshold for the basin of attrac-
tion surrounding the grim strategy (which requires an initial action of cooperate),
hence considering the empirical frequency we can argue that most of the subjects
should best respond by choosing to cooperate in the first round.
In the neutral treatment there seem to be more participants that best respond
(by cooperating) in round 1 than in the positive mood treatment, although the
difference is not significant. Figure 2.8 is related to the sessions in which we elicited
beliefs from participants prior to their choice of actions. The four panels report
the share of subjects which reported beliefs about their partners above the basin of
attraction of defecting in the 1st round and consistently with these beliefs, chose to
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cooperate. Hence we can argue these subjects are better at best-responding to their
partners’ expected strategies. We note that in both the “infinite” setting with chat
and the “finite” setting without chat, participants in the neutral mood treatment
are more likely to best-respond than participants in the good mood treatments. We
can summarize:
Result 2.3.5. Participants in the neutral treatment best-respond more frequently
than in the positive mood treatment.
Note however that in the “finite” setting with chat, the difference is not
significant.
2.3.3 Accuracy of Beliefs
Next we consider beliefs. In figure 2.9, we report the errors in predicting partners
choices, defined by the absolute difference between the stated probability of their
partners’ cooperation and true behavior. Participants in the neutral mood condition
make on average fewer errors than subjects in the “infinite” setting with chat and
in the “finite” setting without chat.
We also see that neutral treatment participants seem to have more accurate
beliefs when we consider all rounds as in figure 2.10.
To summarize:
Result 2.3.6. Participants in the neutral mood treatment have more accurate beliefs
about their partners’ choices.
Once again we do need to note a caveat: the difference is not significant in
the “finite” setting with chat.
2.3.4 Text Analysis of the Pre-play Communication
In this section we provide a brief analysis of the text contained within the pre-play
communication in the “chat” treatments. In figure 2.11 we calculate the positive and
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negative emotions contained within the words included in the text messages trans-
mitted between partners prior to the start of each super-games using text-analysis
software (Pennebaker et al., 2001). Consistent with our earlier results we find that
subjects in the positive mood sessions are less cooperative. We observe that the
text within the pre-play messages feature less positive emotion and more negative
emotion than in the sessions with positive mood induction. Recall that mood in-
duction occurs prior to the opportunity to engage in pre-play communication, and
so the text analysis seems to be indicating that participants in the positive mood
induction treatment are less positive in their dialogues with their partners.
We also analyzed the use of the pronoun “I”, generally considered a sign of
inward orientation. In figure 2.12 we observe that participants in the positive mood
treatment make more use of the pronoun “I” than participants in the neutral mood
treatment. Summarizing:
Result 2.3.7. Participants in the positive mood treatment are less positive in their
communication and more inward-oriented.
We argue in the next section that this finding seems consistent with our
finding that participants in the positive mood treatments are also less cooperative.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine the causal relationship between mood and cooperative
behaviour under repeated setting. We use a combination of Velten MIP and Music
MIP to induce positive mood and neutral mood in a controlled lab environment.
Participants play repeated PD with two other treatments: chat -where we allow
pre-play communication; and finite where the repetition is either finite or infinite.
Our results suggest that in games of cooperation mood undoubtedly matters;
in particular, players in a positive mood are less prone to cooperate. This holds for
both finite and infinite repetitions, but the difference is more robust in infinite
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repetitions. Everything else being equal, subjects in positive mood exhibit lower
levels of cooperation. This seems to be because individuals in a neutral mood
have better accuracy of belief and are closer to a best response with respect to
their beliefs. Both effects seems to support the notion that individuals in a neutral
mood have superior cognitive skills and for this reason perform better in a strategic
environment, which confirms the findings in Gill and Prowse (2016) and Proto et al.
(2014). In addition, our text analysis of pre-play communication suggested that
individuals in a positive mood can be more inward-oriented.
Our results lend support to the notion that cognitive and emotional function
of the brain influence each other (Damasio, 1994) and offer an explanation as to why
in one shot games – where there are fewer or no strategic interactions – positive
mood generates more cooperative behaviour, while under repeated interaction –
where strategic interactions involve a greater need for cognitive functions – positive
mood lead to a reduced incidence of cooperation. This also explains the finding in
Oswald et al. (2015) that better mood boosts productivity: the task examined in
that paper does not involve cooperation or any form of strategic interaction.
The main contribution of this paper is that it systematically establishes a
causal relationship between positive mood and cooperative behaviour and provides
evidence on the mechanisms of the same.
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Tables & Figures
Table 2.1: Stage Game
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 51, 51 22, 63
Defect 63, 22 39, 39
Table 2.2: Differences in mean across treatments
Variable Neutral Positive Differences Std. dev N
Age 28.37 21.22 7.15 84.06 552
Female .63 .65 -.01 0.47 552
Extraversion 3.29 3.34 -0.05 0.47 552
Agreeableness 3.65 3.61 0.36 0.52 552
Conscientiousness 3.52 3.55 -0.02 0.51 552
Neuroticism 2.94 2.94 -0.01 0.57 552
Openness 3.40 3.36 0.04 0.46 552
Risk Aversion 0.56 0.56 -0.01 0.12 552
Raven† 17.82 17.22 0.59* 4.19 534
Stated Mood 3.63 3.85 -0.22*** 0.74 552
† except session 14
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Figure 2.1: Cooperation rates in the different treatments
The four panels report the cooperation rates computed over observations in all
neutral and positive mood sessions, aggregated separately for all different
treatments; bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.2: Cooperation rates in the different treatments in the sessions with beliefs.
The four panels report the cooperation rates computed over observations in all
neutral and positive mood sessions, aggregated separately for all different
treatments; bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.3: Average payoffs in the different treatments.
The four panels report the average individual payoffs earned in each round
computed over observations in all neutral and positive mood sessions, aggregated
separately for all different treatments; bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.4: Average payoffs in the different treatments in the sessions with beliefs.
The four panels report the average individual payoffs earned in each round
computed over observations in all neutral and positive mood sessions, aggregated
separately for all different treatments; bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.5: Cooperation rates per round in the different treatments.
The four panels report the cooperation rates per round computed over
observations all neutral (blue colour) and positive (red colour) mood sessions,
aggregated separately for all different treatments; the dashed red lines mark the
end of each of the 3 supergames per session. The black diamond mark the basin of
attraction of cooperation in the 1st period of each supergame.
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Figure 2.6: Cooperations rates per round in the different treatments in the sessions
with beliefs
The four panels report the cooperation rates per round computed over
observations from all neutral (blue colour) and positive (red colour) mood sessions,
aggregated separately for all different treatments; the dashed red lines mark the
end of each of the 3 supergames per session. The black diamonds mark the basin
of attraction of cooperation in the 1st period of each supergame.
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Figure 2.7: Cooperative choices consistent with beliefs in the first round.
The four panels report the share of the cooperative choices when individuals’
beliefs about partners’ cooperative choices are in the basin of attraction of the
cooperative choices computed over observations in neutral and positive mood
sessions with beliefs, aggregated separately for all different treatments; bands
represent 95% confidence intervals. .
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Figure 2.8: Choices consistent with beliefs in the first round.
The four panels report the share of choices consistent with beliefs about partner
choices computed over observations in neutral and positive mood sessions with
beliefs, aggregated separately for all different treatments; bands represent 95%
confidence intervals. .
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Figure 2.9: Errors in the beliefs about partners’ choices in the first rounds.
The four panels report the average errors in the beliefs in the first round of each
supergame, defined by the absolute difference between the stated probability of
partners’ cooperation and the actual choices. They are aggregated separately for
all different treatments with beliefs; bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.10: Errors in the beliefs about partners’ choices.
The four panels report the average likelihood error in the beliefs about partners’
cooperative choices in every round of each supergame, aggregated separately for all
different treatments with beliefs; bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.11: Emotions in the text analysis of the chat
The six panels report the average positive and negative emotions calculated from
the text in the pre-play communication at the beginning of each supergame,
aggregated separately in the positive mood (red) and neutral mood (blue) sessions;
bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.12: Use of the pronoun “I” in the text analysis
The six panels report the average number of times the pronoun “I” is used in the
pre-play communication at the beginning of each supergame, aggregated
separately in the positive mood (red) and neutral mood (blue) sessions; bands
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Chapter 3
Mood, Risk and Belief:
Motivations in Social Dilemma
3.1 Introduction
Social dilemmas isolate a conflict between collective welfare and personal interest;
the contribution to a common resource helps all the other members of the group
but at a personal cost to the contributor. One of the most commonly used games
in economics to capture the essence of social dilemma is the Public Goods (PG)
game. This is essentially a scenario where groups of two or more people allocate
their individual endowment between a private account that benefits only them, and a
public account, where the sum of all contributions is multiplied by an efficiency factor
and shared equally between all group members. The PG game has a Pareto efficient
solution where players cooperate, contributing the maximum; but a different Nash
equilibrium where according to the standard economic model of utility, players act
purely self-interestedly and free ride by contributing a minimum amount or nothing.
Empirical evidence shows that, contrary to the standard economic model, PG game
players usually contribute something and contributions range from zero to 100% of
endowment with an average contribution of about 50% (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
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Another game that encapsulates a social dilemma scenario is the trust game1.
In this game a trustor decides to send some money over to a trustee which the ex-
perimenter multiplies by a factor. The trustee has the option to return some of that
money. Pay-off maximising behaviour of trustor and trustee implies that the trustee
would indeed abuse trust, if trust is placed. Assuming that the trustor anticipates
this, he/she does not place trust in the first place. If trust is not placed, however,
both trustor and trustee are worse off than when trust is placed and honoured. This
outcome however is suboptimal. Such a conflict between individual and collective
reasoning is the core feature of a social dilemma.
In this paper we look at these social dilemma games with the idea of multiple
motives. The main idea is that individual behaviour depends on the interaction of
multiple motives.2 Motivated by the results from Chapter 2 of this thesis, this
chapter specifically looks at the interaction between mood and choices in social
dilemma. We also explore the idea of multiple motives and see how individual’s
mood, risk attitude and belief about partner’s choice, affects behaviour. In addition,
we explore this relationship in a situation where individuals earn their ’endowment’
or wealth by a real effort task and receive no feedback about their earning.3 We
induce mood by a combination of two Mood Induction Processes (MIPs): the Velten
MIP and Music MIP. After completing a real effort task, participants are randomly
matched in groups of two to make decisions in a one shot PG game and trust game,
1Some variation of this game is also known as the investor game or gift exchange game.
2For example, Engel and Zhurakhovska (2016) examine behaviour in a one shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game. They considered multiple motives: fear - measured by risk aversion and loss
aversion; greed-opposite of generosity measured with a risky dictator game; efficiency-measured
by the size of pay-off from cooperation and conditional cooperation- participant’s belief about the
cooperativeness of the other players. They found all four motives significantly affected coopera-
tion but some individually, only if the other three motives were controlled for. In their view this
explained why earlier studies that examined only one motive did not show significant results.
3We call this feature of the design as ambiguity, meaning: the quality of being open to more
than one interpretation; inexactness.. This is not used in the traditional meaning of the word in
economics, rather is used to present a scenario where subjects are not given full information about
their earning in the real effort task.We include this feature to check if the information environment
has any affect in the choices under the two mood conditions. This is again motivated from the
results in chapter 2, we wanted to further explore how mood affects decision making process under
different settings.
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where they are paid for one of the tasks. We elicit beliefs by asking participants
to state how much they believe their partner is going to contribute, which are
incentivised using a quadratic scoring rule. Risk preferences are measured using the
30 item DOSPERT questionnaire and one specific question on social risk.4
We find that, participants in positive mood receive higher score in the real
effort task and on the GMAT test5.However, we find that mood has no effect on
contributions made in the PG game or the offers made in the trust game, but
belief is highly significant in both cases. Our results suggest that the effect of
mood on choices are sensitive to the information environment and strategic interac-
tion.Positive mood seems to enhance performance in tasks which require individual
effort, but the effect disappears when one shot strategic decisions are involved.
The paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3.3 describes our experimental design and its implementation, section 3.4
presents our results and discussions and section 3.5 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 Literature Review
Although standard economic theory suggests that the source of income or an en-
dowment should not affect people’s preferences and their associated choices, this is
contradicted by empirical evidence. Notable examples are Muehlbacher and Kirchler
(2009) who argue that experiments where participants are given windfall money to
fund their risky decisions are unrealistic since this rarely happens in real life; Arkes
et al. (1994) show that people spend windfall gains more readily than expected in-
come; Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) show that people who obtained a mug by
performing a task valued it more highly than those who obtained one by chance and
those who earned a mug by strong performance valued it more highly than those
who earned one by weak performance. Cherry et al. (2005) show that participants
4the additional risk question followed from Cubitt et al. (2015) was added as a robustness check.
5The GMAT test is used as a test of cognitive skill
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in UGs and Dictator games tend to give less when they earn their endowments,
rather than receive them from the experimenter.
For the PG game, expending effort to earn an endowment may be expected
to increase its subjective value from the participant’s perspective and reduce his
or her inclination to spend it. Additionally, because the participants may consider
their endowment compensation for their efforts, they may be less willing to take the
risk of contributing to the public account. However, empirical evidence supporting
this idea is mixed. Cherry et al. (2005) found no evidence of a relationship between
contributions in PG and endowment sources, Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009) found
that participants who earned their endowments by exerting a high level of effort
contributed less than low effort participants, whereas Oxoby and Spraggon (2006)
found participants with higher effort contributed more. In this study, we use a real
effort task to see if mood affects the level of effort put in by participants under the
two conditions and to check if this extends to their choice of contribution amount.
A large number of factors have been found to impact the level of cooperation
in the PG game. Wilkinson and Klaes (2012) examine individual differences such
as age, culture and family background; Sally (1995) looks at the framing of the
instructions, and Ledyard et al. (1997) looks at repetitions of the game. Rand et al.
(2012) investigates the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making by using a
dual process framework. They use economic games to see if people are predisposed
towards selfishness. There are a few important findings of the paper, first they
show that if subjects are primed to trust their intuitions, it increases contributions
compared to a prime that promotes greater reflection. Second, forcing subjects
to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and
forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, they find subjects
who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Although we do not
directly test for the causal relationship between response time and cooperation in
our study, our results indicate that there is no difference in the response times under
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the two mood conditions which could explain why we also do not find any difference
in contributions. Drouvelis and Grosskopf (2016) find that people contribute more
in a PG game when induced with positive mood, compared to angry mood. In
our study we find no difference in amount of contributions made in the two mood
conditions. One possible reason could be that we compare positive mood to neutral
mood, where as in their study Drouvelis and Grosskopf (2016) compare positive
mood to angry mood.
One of the earliest papers to look at trust and reciprocity in an investment
setting was Berg et al. (1995). Ever since then, studies have identified a variety
of characteristics that are important in determining and sustaining trust. Bohnet
and Zeckhauser (2004) show that individuals require an additional ‘risk premium’ to
offer their trust, which highlights that there is an inherent element of risk involved
when trusting others. Ashraf et al. (2006) find that expectations of high returns as
well as unconditional kindness are important predictors of trust choices in a trust
game. In this paper we find both risk preferences and beliefs or expectations of
partners return are important indicators of trusting behaviour. Kirchsteiger et al.
(2006) examined behaviour in the trust game where participants were induced with
either good or bad mood using a funny or sad movie clip. They found that, although
initial offers were higher or more generous in a good mood, over time those in a bad
mood were more reciprocal. In the one shot version of the trust game in our study,
we find no such evidence. Other empirical findings show that people in a positive
mood are more likely to follow designated social norms (Hertel et al., 2000); view
selfish behaviour less negatively (Drouvelis and Powdthavee, 2015) and both trust
and distrust others more when given appropriate cues (Lount Jr, 2010).
Economic experiments with mood also continue to challenge the standard
economic assumption that people have fixed sets of preferences. Guiso et al. (2013)
looked at investment data and a customer questionnaire from an Italian bank and
found that fear drove risk aversion in financial markets shortly after the 2008 finan-
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cial crash. This was true even for those unlikely to have been financially affected
themselves. The authors suggest that this could be a sort of contagion effect but
equally it could be that the beliefs of how others will behave matters more to peo-
ple. The authors also found a similar level of increased risk aversion when testing
their findings in a laboratory experiment by asking participants to make monetary
gambles after watching a horror movie clip. This suggests that the impact of mood
on peoples economic decision making may be directly related to risk.
In this chapter, we explore the interplay between mood, risk and beliefs in a
social dilemma setting with limited information.
3.3 Experimental Design
A full details of experiment instructions are present in appendix J. Details of the
mood induction process, the games and implementation are described below.
3.3.1 Mood Induction Process
A mood induction procedure (MIP) is a technique used to influence the mood of
the participants in an experiment; towards being elated or depressed or inert. We
simultaneously apply a combination of two mood induction processes, namely, the
Velten MIP and Music MIP, as it has an additive influence on effectiveness (Bower,
1981). The Velten MIP involves reading and reflecting on the meaning of a number
of statements. In the positive mood induction settings, the statements describe
somatic states or self-evaluations. An example of a statement under the positive
setting is If your attitude is good, then things are good, and my attitude is good
(Velten, 1968). In the neutral state, participants are presented with trivial and
factual statements which carry no emotional load. For example, The orient express
travels between Paris and Istanbul. A detailed list of the statements are provided in
appendix N. In our experiment we use the 50 statement version of Velten following
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Isen and Gorgoglione (1983). In order to induce a more sensory method of induction,
a Music MIP was used. Implementation of this procedure is rather straightforward
as it mainly involves getting participants to listen to a piece of music. In the positive
condition we used Mozart’s Eine kleine Nacht Musik Allegro. In contrast, subjects
in the control group were required to listen to the neutral piece of music Aerial
Boundaries by Michael Hedges. The whole mood induction procedure lasted for
approximately 7.5 minutes.
3.3.2 The Games
Real Effort Task
After the mood induction process, subjects participate in three separate tasks. We
implement a real effort task game for subjects to earn their endowment which is
traditionally given by the experimenter as an endowment. Studies have found that
individuals perform differently in tasks when they have to earn the money compared
to when money is simply given to them (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2009). The real
effort task we use is the Encryption Task. Subjects are given an encryption table
which assigns a number to each letter of the alphabet in a random order. Each
subject is then presented with words in a predetermined sequence (which is the
same for all participants) and is asked to encrypt them by substituting the letters
with numbers using the encryption table. The task was repeated for 5 rounds, each
round for 2 minutes with 10 second break in between for a total of just over 10
minutes. A screenshot of the task is presented in appendix K.
Public Goods Game
We use a one shot PG game. Participants were asked what percentage of their
endowment they wish to contribute to the purchasing of a public good with their
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partner.6 It was explained that their pay-off is their endowment less the combined
group fund multiplied by 1.5 by the experimenter and then divided equally among
the two of them. More explicitly, participant’s individual pay-off function is ex-
pressed as: payoff = endowment-contribution + (group fund × 1.5) ÷ 2
Once the participants choose an amount to contribute we ask them to pre-
dict how much they think their partner will contribute. A participant’s pay-off for
the belief task depends on how close their estimate is to their partner’s actual con-
tribution. A quadratic function rule was used to incentivise the belief elicitation.
Specifically, the stated likelihood “R” was entered into the following formula, where
“r” denotes the realized action of the partner. E is the experimental unit earned
from belief elicitation. One randomly chosen E was then multiplied by £1 and added
to the participants earning.
E = 1− ( R
100
− r
100
)2
Trust Game
We use the standard one shot two-person trust game. Each subject was randomly
and anonymously matched with another participant in a pair. We use the strategy
method where each participant makes conditional decisions for each possible role, in
this case as both sender(trustor) and receiver(trustee).7 We also elicit belief about
their partner’s choice in both roles.The same scoring rule was applied to incentivise
this belief elicitation. The payoff functions for the sender and receiver are:
Sender payoff = (endowment-offer amount) + return amount
Receiver payoff = endowment + (offer amount × 2) - return amount
6It was explained that endowment here is what subject’s received based on their performance
in the real effort task.
7We used the words sender and receiver instead ot trustor and trustee to avoid using loaded
language.
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3.3.3 Questionnaire
After completion of the tasks the participants were asked to fill out a simple ques-
tionnaire. The form included questions on personal information such as their age,
gender, current degree course, native language, country of origin, year of study and
political affiliation (a scale from 1 to 7 ranging from far left to far right).
To measure intelligence 5 GMAT-style questions were asked followed from
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) to distinguish between effort and ability. A full list
of questions is available in appendix M.
A 30-item DOSPERT questionnaire was used to elicit risk preferences of
participants following (Blais and Weber, 2006). The DOSPERT questionnaire has
6 questions from 5 different risk domains: financial, ethical, social, recreational and
health and safety. We also ask an additional risk question specifically on social risk
taken from (Cubitt et al., 2015) study: For personal reasons, you have to travel to a
big city. From the airport you can choose between two taxi companies to reach your
final destination for which you dont know the exact route. Company A charges you a
fixed price of £12. Company B charges you according to the taxi meter. If the driver
takes the direct route, it costs you £8. However, 1 out of 5 drivers take detours to
make more money out of you and the fare is then £16. Which taxi company do you
choose?. Possible answers are either Company A or Company B.8. This additional
question was asked as we were particularly interested in social risk perception of
participants and we were keen to check if the results were consistent across the two
methods used in this study.
To measure trust - two World Value Survey (WVS) questions were included
to capture trust and fairness perception. According to (Tho¨ni et al., 2012) the trust
question is a proxy for individual’s preference to cooperate rather their than beliefs
about others co-operation; whereas the fairness question is a proxy for individual’s
8The original question is in USD currency, we adapt the currency to GBP to suit the subjects.
A risk neutral subject would choose Company B, which has an expected cost of £9.6. We interpret
the result as Company A (socially risk averse) and Company B (not socially risk averse)
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beliefs and their optimism rather than their preferences. The trust question is:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant
be too careful in dealing with people? with the binary answer choice of either most
people can be trusted or cant be too careful.. The fairness question is: Do you think
most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they
try to be fair? with the binary answer choice of either would take advantage of you
or would try to be fair.
To check for the mood induction process, participants were asked to recall
and assess how they felt after listening to the music at the beginning of the session
on a 5-point scale from Not at all Happy to Very Happy; and a general life satis-
faction question. Such self-reports are usually held to be a valid approach for the
measurement of emotions Robinson and Clore (2002).
Finally participants answered questions about how many of 4 defined bad
life events (BLE) they had experienced: whether there has been bereavement in the
close family; bereavement in the extended family; parental divorce or life-threatening
illness. The BLE questions were asked last to avoid any impact on current mood
through priming effects.
3.3.4 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory at the department of Economics at
University of Warwick. Participants were recruited through the SONA recruitment
platform.The study was conducted in a computerised lab equipped to accomodate
20 subjects per session. In total 8 sessions were conducted over 5 days with a total
of 128 participants (dates in appendix I). The median age of the participants was
21; 76 were female and 124 of them were studying for a degree at Warwick. People
were not eligible to participate if they were studying Economics; had been taught
game theory or had participated in the study before. Subjects were paid for one of
the tasks randomly chosen by the computer, either the PG game or the trust game
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and this was made clear at the beginning of the experiment.The average earning
was £15 including a show up fee of £4. Each session lasted for about 50 minutes.
3.4 Results and Discussion
We begin by looking at the demographic characteristics across the two treatments;
neutral mood and positive mood. We look at the individual characteristics which
may not be affected by the treatment or any other external factor. Table 3.1 shows
the mean age, year of study, gender and native language of the participants in the
two treatments. There is slight difference in age, but this is mainly because there
were four participants aged above 40 in the neutral treatment (out of 64 participants
in total). Excluding these subjects from the sample reveals no age difference between
the two groups, analysis carried out without these four subjects are no different than
what is presented here, so we keep them through out the analysis.
We now focus on our main results. To check if the mood induction process
worked we check the self-reported data by the participants on their mood. Positive
mood participants state a mean score of .682 compared to .447 for participants in
neutral mood (normalised to a 0 to 1 scale), where 0 means not at all happy and 1
indicates very happy. The difference is an average score of -.234, which is statistically
significant at 0.1% (p-value 0.000). The results were consisted with a Mann-Whitney
U test which showed that the median stated mood was statistically different for
positive mood and neutral mood (p-value 0.000) subjects. Figure 3.1 shows the
difference in stated mood of the participants under the two mood conditions.
Next, we look at performance of individuals in the real effort task. Figure
3.2 shows the number of correct encryptions completed by subjects over the five
periods. Each period lasted for 2 minutes, so the whole task was just over 10
minutes. Overall there is an upward slope which indicates that subjects get better
with each period, so there is some learning effect. We believe the learning process
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could be based on familiarity with how to use the key board efficiently. The red line
indicating performance of participants in positive mood, is always above the blue
line performance of participants in neutral mood. The difference is smallest in the
fourth period but in the last period it again increases.
On average positive mood participant’s can solve 9.55 encryptions, whereas
neutral mood solves around 9.2 and the difference is significant at 5%. We use
the measure correct as the proxy for effort put in by participants. A more general
measure of effort would be the number of encoding attempted by the individual,
which includes the encryptions which were incorrect. In our sample, 88% of all
individuals made no mistakes in their encryption, the other 10 % made one error
and less than 2% made more than one error. We use the more restricted measure
of effort, which is the number of correct encryptions done by the individuals. We
believe the task at hand was not reliant on ability so the measure correct is reflective
of the effort put in by the individual. We can see from the graph that people in
positive mood put in more effort across the five periods. This result is consistent
with findings of Oswald et al. (2009) who find that relative to a neutral condition,
happy participants were more productive in mental arithmetic tasks. Importantly,
they did not find that cognition was improved such that happy participants were
better at the game but that happy participants attempted more of the tasks in the
allotted time and in doing so got more correct answers. This leads to our first result.
Result 1: Participant’s in positive mood show higher effort compared to
participants in neutral mood.
Next we examine behaviour in the PG game, especially on the contributions
made by individuals in the game. We begin by looking at the average contributions
made by subjects under the two mood conditions. Specifically, subjects were asked
to state what percentage of their endowment they are willing to contribute to the
public fund. We ask for percentage amounts instead of actual contribution amounts
as the endowment earned from the effort task was not revealed to subjects after
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the effort task. This was done to check if ambiguity about their endowment has
any effect on mood effects. Appendix L shows the histogram of contributions made
by subjects in positive and neutral mood. No significant statistical difference was
found between the two distributions.
Figure 3.3 shows that mean offers in the neutral mood (M= 45.84, sd=
31.53) and positive mood (M= 49.64, sd= 33.34) are very similar and any difference
is statistically not significant (p-value= .5092).9 We wanted to further examine the
contribution amounts so we ran regression estimations where the dependent variable
is contribution made in the game (value between 0 to 100) (table 3.2). In the first
column, we see positive mood has no significant effect. We also add variables social
risk aversion and beliefs, and as expected we can see belief is highly significant. In
column 2 we add interaction variable for mood and risk preference. Here we can
see that, positive mood has some effect, but only at 10% significance level. Risk
aversion is important, the more risk averse an individual- the less is the amount of
contribution. More importantly, belief is still highly significant.
It is possible that we do not find any consistent effect of mood on the con-
tribution amount for the following two reasons. First, subjects are not informed
about their actual endowment, this creates an ambiguity. Subjects not only have
to decide how much they want to contribute but also how much endowment they
actually have. There may be opposing forces nullifying the effect of positive mood
on contribution amounts. In one way there may be optimism bias, which makes
subjects in positive mood think they have a large endowment so they may choose a
smaller percentage to contribute, or they may be more generous as indicated by the
literature. We think it would be interesting to isolate the effects of these effects in
future research. Second, we use a one shot interaction. It is possible the difference
only arrives after repeated interactions. We can now state our second result:
Result 2: Positive mood has no consistent effect on contributions made in
9Additional non-parametric tests were carried out using the Mann-Whitney U test and the
results were consistent with the findings of a ttest (p-value=.5819)
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the public goods game.
The participants also played a one shot trust game. Here we look at the
effect of mood on the offer made by player 1 (sender) and the amount of return
chosen by player 2 (receiver). Similar to the PG game, here we also elicit offer
and retrun amounts in percentages as endowment was not revealed to subjects.
Appendix L shows histograms of the sender’s and receiver’s offer amounts in the
trust game. Both distributions are slightly right skewed with spikes around the
median. A test of distributions showed no statistical difference between the two
mood conditions. Figure 3.4 and figure 3.5 show the average offers and returns
made by senders and receivers in the trust game, respectively. As evident from the
figure, there is almost no difference in the amount of offers/returns made by subjects
in the two mood conditions. For the senders the difference in average offer in the
positive mood (M= 29.14, sd= 26.72) and neutral mood (M=25.01, sd= 26.18) is
4.125 (p-value 0.3794). For the receivers this difference in the return amount is
even smaller (2.4375). On average positive mood subjects return 32.51 (sd=26.75)
and neutral mood participants choose to return 30.07 (sd= 25.37). Table 3.3 shows
simple regression results that show that mood does not significantly affect offers or
returns in the trust game. However, beliefs are highly significant. Here as well,
belief is the dominant factor, the more you expect the partner to return, the more
you send to the partner. The results are not that surprising when we consider the
specific design in our experiments. Since the participant’s are not aware of their
own endowment or their partner’s endowment, this creates extra ambiguity in the
scenario. It is possible that due to ambiguity the effect of mood is eroded and belief-
which is more inherent and possibly formed by other factors, has a stronger effect.
The effect of belief overpowers the effects of mood.
Result 3: There is no effect of positive mood in offers and returns made in
the trust game.
Finally, we test for cognitive intelligence using the GMAT questions. Figure
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3.6 shows that participants in positive mood answer on average 80% of the GMAT
questions correctly, compared to 67% answered by participants in neutral mood
(p value 0.0054). This is consistent with the literature that finds, positive mood
enhances problem solving and decision making, leading to cognitive processing that
is not only flexible, innovative, and creative, but also thorough and efficient Isen
(2001); Baumeister et al. (1998).
Result 4: Mood affects cognition and participants in positive mood have
higher cognitive intelligence.
The main implication of our results is that mood has an effect on effort
related task and cognitive related task. But has no effect on the decision to make
contributions to the PG game or on reciprocity in the trust game. The result may
seem surprising at first, but if we look closer an interesting pattern emerges. Both
the real effort task and the cognitive intelligence test relied on individual’s own self.
There was no strategic element to these tasks. However the decision to either make
a contribution or offer a positive amount to the partner is a strategic decision. It
involves elements of uncertainty and in our special design an element of ambiguity.
In this scenario, it is possible that the effect of positive mood is cancelled out by
the existence of ambiguity in our study.
One possible mechanism through which mood affects cognition, which is
required for both effort task and GMAT test is that, there is reduced cognitive load
under positive mood so it is possible for subjects in positive mood to engage in more
deliberate thinking and make decisions more efficiently. Unfortunately, we cannot
directly test for this in our study. All participants had a fixed amount of time to
complete the effort task and we did not have a time record for the cognitive test.
But we can check for response time in the two mood conditions across all decisions in
the PG game and trust game. Table 3.4 shows the mean response time measured in
seconds. Simple t-test results reveal there is no significant difference in the response
times and this pattern is consistent through out the three decisions. This could be
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another reason why we do not see any effect of mood on these decisions, perhaps
the effect of mood on processing strategy fades away under ambiguity.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we test the multiple motive idea to see how mood, risk and belief
affect strategic interactions across different games. We use a combination of Velten
and Music MIP to induce positive or neutral mood in subjects. Risk perceptions are
measured using the DOSPERT 30-item and an additional social risk question. Belief
was elicited by asking participants to state the likelihood of their partner’s actions.
A real-effort task was used to allow participants to earn their initial endowments.
Participants were also asked to play a one shot PG game and a one shot trust game,
followed by a cognition test using GMAT questions.
We find that people in positive mood put in more effort compared to people in
neutral mood and perform better in the cognitive intelligence test. However, we find
that mood in presence of ambiguity is overpowered by beliefs and decisions in public
goods game and trust games are driven mostly by belief rather than participant’s
mood. The most significant motivation in choosing how much to contribute or how
much to offer in the trust game is- belief, with a positive relationship seen between
a participants beliefs about their partners contribution and their own contribution.
These results are also in line with the PG game research by Kocher et al. (2011) that
similarly used incentives to elicit beliefs and found the same relationship between
beliefs and contribution. Most participants cooperate if they believe their partner
wants to cooperate too, with their contribution depending on how optimistic they
are about their partners contribution (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
One reason why we do not find effect of mood on the strategic games could
be because there is increased ambiguity here, as participants do not know the size
of their own and their partners endowments. It is possible that uncertainty and the
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associated risk may become a more important factor in decision-making. Addition-
ally, participants earned their endowments in a real-effort task rather than receiving
them from the experimenter, if people regard their endowment as compensation for
their effort this could make the financial risk of contribution more salient. The main
implication from this paper is that mood affects decision making, but only when the
decision structure in unambiguous and non-strategic. In presence of ambiguity, the
effect of mood is overpowered by other motivation, for example expectations. This
paper opens up possibility for future research to examine under what environment
positive mood has a causal effect on decision making process.
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Table 3.1: Differences in demographic characteristics across mood
Variable Neutral Positive Differences Std. dev N
Age 23.7656 21.3281 2.4375** 5.8938 128
Female 0.5937 0.5937 0 0.4930 128
Year of study 2.6406 2.4062 0.2343 1.4633 128
Native English 0.4062 0.375 0.0312 0.3049 128
∗(p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗(p < 0.01)
Figure 3.1: The self reported mood of the participants
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Figure 3.2: The correct encryptions in real effort task
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Figure 3.3: The average contribution in the 2-person Public Goods Game.
Table 3.2: Regression estimation for contribution in PG game
Contribution Contribution
M1 M2
b/p b/p
Positive Mood 1.50406 –21.78630*
(0.6723) (0.0545)
Social Risk Aversion –12.15635 –23.11043**
(0.1466) (0.0169)
Positive Mood Risk Aversion 25.67589**
(0.0277)
Belief 1.06908*** 1.05417***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
N 128 128
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Figure 3.4: The average offer in the 2-person Gift Exchange Game.
Figure 3.5: The average return in the 2-person Gift Exchange Game.
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Table 3.3: Regression estimation in the Trust game
Offer Offer Reurn Return
M1 M2 M3 M4
b/p b/p b/p b/p
Positive Mood –0.05053 –15.53900 –1.13550 –1.98354
(0.9933) (0.4077) (0.8153) (0.7957)
Risk Aversion –13.22053 –20.58345 –8.94422 –4.86903
(0.1536) (0.1000) (0.2522) (0.5136)
Positive Mood Risk Averse 17.00567 –0.62026
(0.3300) (0.9427)
Belief 0.68919*** 0.68139***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Belief 0.68884*** 0.95494***
(0.0003) (0.0000)
N 128 128 128 128
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Figure 3.6: The average score on 5 GMAT questions
Table 3.4: Differences in response time (seconds) across mood
Neutral Positive Differences Std. dev N
PG game 13.82813 13.8125 0.15625 12.96964 128
Sender 7.59375 8.890625 -1.296875 6.556533 128
Receiver 9.109375 10.82813 -1.71875 9.25912 128
∗(p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗(p < 0.01)
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Appendices
A Chapter 1: Advertisement for study participation
A.1
B Chapter 1: Experiment Dates
A.2
C Chapter 1: Picture of the laboratory
A.3
D Chapter 1: Experiment Instructions
Good morning/afternoon and thank you for coming to participate in our economic
experiment. This may be the first time many of you are participating in a session
like this, so please feel free to ask questions. Before we begin, please check that the
number on the card handed to you matches with the number on the computer that
you are seated in. Also please make sure that you have read the information sheet
provided and signed the consent form. A couple of general rules of such experiments:
• Please do not communicate with each other at any point. Unfortunately if
you do so, we will have to cancel your participation and the whole session will
be cancelled. If you have any questions, raise your hand and the experimenter
will come and answer your question.
• Also, please do not use your mobile phones during the experiment.
The next set of instructions will come up on your computer screens. We will
now begin the experiment.
Start General Instructions
By carefully reading the following instructions, you can depending on your
decisions earn money in addition to the show-up fee of Tk. 250 taka. It is, therefore,
of importance that you accurately read these instructions. The amount of money you
earn in the task is called your payoff. During the whole experiment communication
with other participants is not allowed. Therefore, we ask you to not speak with each
other. If you do not understand something, please ask the experimenter by raising
your hand. We will come to your place and answer your question individually.
Also bear in mind that you may have to wait few moments during the ex-
periment, as we want everyone to finish at the same time. You will see the message
Please, wait. on your screen when this is applicable. Todays experiment consists of
the following: In the first part, you will be asked to answer some questions about
yourself. In the second part, you will complete a decision making task. In the third
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part you will take part in a visual puzzle. And finally there will be some questions
for you to answer. Detailed instructions for each part will follow.
Start Questionnaire: Demographic questions
In this part you will read a small paragraph about a topic. Please read the
text carefully.
Decades of research in experimental economics has shown that preferences
of individuals and their economic behaviour are quite heterogeneous. The literature
has attempted to explain this heterogeneity due to different factors such as age,
educational background, cultural differences, income levels and social status, among
others. One of the most important factors that has been analyzed thoroughly is the
role of gender in economic behaviour.Recent surveys which review the literature on
gender differences in experimental economics have found that, women tend be more
generous and demonstrate a fairer approach towards distribution of wealth when
compared to men of similar background. For example, authors Guth, Schimdt and
Sutter (2007) find that female participants are significantly more likely to offer equal
splits of a pie or sum of money than are men, and suggest this is because women
are averse to the idea of inequality.
Start Paragraph and UG
In this task, each of you will be randomly matched with someone in this room
to make decisions; we call the randomly matched person your partner. You and your
partner will play the role of either a Proposer (P), or a Responder (R). The computer
will randomly assign you to one of these roles. However, no participant will ever
know the identity of the person they are partnered with, everything will remain
anonymous. In the task, the role of the Proposer (P) is to propose a distribution of
Tk. 500 between P and R. The role of R is to state the minimum amount of money
that he/she is willing to accept from P, we call this the Minimum Acceptable Offer
(MAO). If the offer made by P is greater or equal to the MAO of the R, each player
gets the amount proposed by the Proposer. If the offer made by P is less than the
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MAO of R, both players (P and R) get 0.
For example:
”If P offers Tk X and Rs MAO is Tk. Y then,
Ps pay-off is Tk. (500−X) and Rs payoff is Tk. X ; if X >= Y
Ps pay-off is Tk. 0 and Rs payoff is Tk. 0 if X < Y
Start Raven
You will now perform a visual puzzle. There will be 30 puzzles for you to
solve. Your score in this puzzle will be given to you at the end of the experiment
while you receive your payment. You will see an example on your screen before you
begin.
Start Final Questionnaire
Thank you. Now you will answer some questions about yourself, while we
calculate your payoff from todays experiment. In the first part of the experiment
you will be asked to answer some questions about yourself. Questionnaire
• Personal Information (Open ended): age, year of study, high school grade,
current degree course
• Categorical questions: gender, degree course, year of study, mode of instruc-
tion in high school, social distance, life satisfaction
• Risk (DOSPERT 30 items questions)
A.6
E Chapter 1: Histogram of offers
A.7
F Chapter 2: Experiment Dates
A.8
G Chapter 2: Experiment Instructions
Good morning and thank you for coming to participate in our economic experiment.
Before we begin, can you please confirm that the number on the card handed to
you while coming in matches with the number on the cubicle that you are seated
in. Just a few points before we begin:
1. Please read all the instructions carefully, there are 3 parts of the experiment
and detailed instructions for each part will be coming on your screen.
2. In the first part, you will be asked to read some simple statements while
listening to an audio track. You have been provided with headphones for
this part of the experiment, you will need this only for the first part of the
experiment, so you can keep it aside after that. Try turning the volume in
your headphones to maximum if you cannot hear properly.
3. In the second part, you will take part in decision tasks and your payoff will be
based on your performance in these tasks. You will be paid for one of these
tasks, randomly chosen.
4. In the third and final part there will be some questions for you to answer.
5. Please do not talk to each other at any point, if you have any questions, raise
your hand and the experimenter will come to you.
6. Also bear in mind that you may have to wait few moments during the experi-
ment, as we want everyone to finish at the same time, you will see the message
Please wait on your screen when this is applicable.
7. Any questions? We will now begin the first part of the experiment.
Start Mood Induction- Happy
In the first part of this experiment, you will be shown a series of screens with
statements typed on them and you will hear some music in the background. The
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success of this part of the experiment will largely depend on your willingness to be
receptive and responsive to the idea in each statement, and to allow each idea to
act upon you without interference. These ideas are called suggestions.
First, as each statement appears, you will simply read it to yourself, then go over
each statement again in your head with the determination and willingness to really
believe it. You will try to experience each idea, you will concentrate your full
attention on it and exclude other ideas which are unrelated to the mood; like, ”Ill
see if this will work.” Following these statements, there will be a brief series of simple
tasks to perform, and following those, there will be a brief questionnaire that you
will have to answer.
Start PD 1
For this part of the experiment I will explain the task on the board, please feel free
to ask any questions you might have. You will also see instructions on your screen.
In this task, each of you will be randomly matched with someone in this room to
make decisions in several rounds. On your screen you will see a similar screen like
what is shown on the board. The computer will ask you to make a choice between C
and D. Your payoff will be presented on the left table and your partner’s payoff will
be presented on the right table. In each table, your decisions (C or D) are represented
in the rows and your partner’s decisions are represented in the columns. The payoffs
of each round will depend on both your decisions as well as your partner’s.
For example, according to the table:
”If you choose C and your partner chooses C, your payoff will be 51 and your
partner’s payoff will be 51.”
”If you choose D and your partner chooses C, your payoff will be 63 and your
partner’s payoff will be 22.”
”If you choose C and your partner chooses D, your payoff will be 22 and your
partner’s payoff will be 63.”
”And finally, if you choose D and your partner chooses D, your payoff will be 39
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and your partner’s payoff will be 39.”
The payoffs you see in the table are in experimental units. Each unit corresponds
to 30 pence. This task will be repeated for at exactly 11 rounds (at least 10 rounds-
for infinite treatment). You will be paid for one if these rounds, chosen randomly
by the computer. Just before you play this we will allow you to chat with your
partner (only for sessions with communication). Just remember to not mention
your identities, if we see your names or computer ID no we will have to cancel your
responses from the chat. So feel free to talk about anything (non-abusive!) and no
identities.
Start PD 2
Thank you for completing the task successfully! You will now be randomly matched
with a different person in the room. You will now complete the same task with your
new partner, that is, you will chat with your partner for 3 minutes in an anonymous
and non-abusive manner(only in communication treatment), followed by playing the
same game exactly 11 rounds (at least 10 rounds).
Start PD 3
Thank you for completing the task successfully! You will now be randomly matched
with another different person in the room. You will now complete the same task
with your new partner, that is, you will chat with your partner for 3 minutes in an
anonymous and non-abusive manner(only in communication treatment), followed
by playing the same game exactly 11 rounds (at least 10 rounds).This is the last
time you will play this. We will then proceed to a different task.
Start RAVEN
You will now perform a visual puzzle. There will be 30 puzzles for you to solve. You
will be paid for three randomly selected correct answers, so you can earn up to 3 in
this task. You will see an example on your screen before you begin.
Start Questionnaire
Thank you. Now you will answer some questions about yourself, while we calculate
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your payoff from todays experiment.
• How old are you?
• What is your year of study?
• What is your gender?
• What is your country of origin?
• Is English your native language?
• In high school, what was the highest possible mark?
• What is your current degree course?
• Would you consider your degree course mostly quantitative or qualitative?
• Personality Questions (Big Five 120 questions)
• Risk preference questions (DOSPERT 30 item )
• Please recall and describe how you felt (your mood) after reading the state-
ments and listening to music at the beginning of the experiment. (5 item
Likert scale, Very happy - Not at all happy)
• How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life in general? (7 item Likert
scale; Not satisfied at all - Completely satisfied)
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H Chapter 2: Basin of Attraction Computations
The following appendix describes the computations required to calculate the basin
of attraction probabilities, following Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011). When calculating
their best response, each player must consider the probability that their rival plays
cooperate or defect. This probability will give rise to a stream of payoffs for a given
strategy, and then strategies can be compared to see which yields the higher payoff.
There will be a threshold belief on the probability of their rival playing each action
which makes a player indifferent and to each side of this threshold we can think
about a basin of attraction as the set of beliefs for which a particular strategy is
optimal. The details of the game can be found in table A.1.
Lets consider the more general stage game
Table A.1: Stage Game
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T,S P, P
Where, following Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2014), R is the cooperative reward,
S is the “sucker” payoff, T is the “temptation” payoff, and P is the “punishment”
payoff, with T > R > P > S
For the Finite Case (exactly Nf = 11 rounds)
The “grim” strategy involves an initial attempt to cooperate but an immedi-
ate response of defect, followed by defect thereafter for a number of rounds > 1 if the
other player is observed to defect at any point. In the “tit for tat” strategy, starting
with cooperation the player punishes defect by the partner only for one period, then
if the partner cooperates the player starts to cooperate again. We generally refer
to these strategies as “sophisticated cooperation”. Finally the the strategy “always
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defect” simply involves playing defect in all periods irrespective of the actions of the
other player.10
Let’s assume that a player expects that the opponent to play “always defect”
with a probability p˜, while she plays “sophisticated cooperation” with a probability
1 − p˜. Note that playing “sophisticated cooperation” against “sophisticated coop-
eration” implies cooperation in every period until the end. Playing “sophisticated
cooperation” against “always defect” implies earning S in the first period then the
cooperation breaks down with a return of P until the end. Playing “always defect”
against “sophisticated cooperation” implies earning T in the first period then the
cooperation breaks down with a return of P until the end. Trivially, playing “always
defect” against “always defect” implies that the couple never cooperate and earn P
every period for the full duration of the game.
Hence the expected payoff from playing the “always defect” strategy in the
finite case is given by the following expression:
p˜(NfP ) + (1− p˜)(T + (Nf − 1)P ) (1)
Intuitively, with probability p˜ two defectors meet returning a payoff of P in
every period, or with probability 1− p˜ the “always defect” player meets a cooperator
and so gains T initially before the other player switches to defect, generating P
thereafter.
Similarly, the expected payoff from playing the “sophisticated cooperation”
strategy is given by the following expression:
p˜(S + (Nf − 1)P ) + (1− p˜)(NfR) (2)
Again, this is simply the probability p˜ that a defector is met, yielding an
initial payoff of S followed by P thereafter, and the probability 1−p˜ that a cooperator
10Restricting attention to these strategies is reasonable from an empirical perspective, Dal Bo´
and Fre´chette (2011) show that subjects play these strategies about 80% of time.
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is met, yielding R for the full duration of the game.
The probability that makes the individual indifferent between playing “so-
phisticated cooperation” and “always defect”, denoted p, that identifies the edge of
the two basins of attraction can be calculated by equating terms 1 and 2:
p(NfP ) + (1− p)(T + (Nf − 1)P ) = p(S + (Nf − 1)P ) + (1− p)(NfR) (3)
or
p =
(Nf − 1)P −NfR+ T
(Nf − 2)P −NfR+ S + T (4)
So that it is optimal to play a sophisticated cooperation strategy iff p˜ < p.
Note that p˜ is a subjective probability.
Therefore we can define subjects with better capacity of predicting partners’
move as the ones more likely to set p˜ close to 1 if their partners choose “always
defect”, and close to 0 their partners choose “sophisticated cooperation”.
Substituting R = 51;T = 63;S = 22;P = 39;Nf = 11 , we have that the
numerical value of the threshold is
p = 0.864
The accuracy in the calculation of p depends on the computational capacity
of the players, who may make mistakes in the calculation of the expected values of
expression 1 and expression 2, or in the solution of equation 3. We call c a mistake
in this calculation and we define subjects with better computational capacity as the
ones for which it is more likely that c = 0.
Hence each individual estimates p˜(c), where c is the computational error,
such that p˜(0) = p.
For the Indefinite treatment (at least Ni = 10 rounds)
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In the indefinite treatment, subjects play 10 rounds for sure, then they know
that the supergame can terminate at anytime. Given that they do not have any other
information, a rational individual would set the termination probability δ˜ = 0.5 for
any round after the 10th.
The payoff from playing the “always defect” strategy is given by the following
expression:
p˜(NiP +
P
1− δ˜ ) + (1− p˜)(T + (Ni − 1)P +
P
1− δ˜ ) (5)
Intuitively with probability p˜ another “always defect” player is met which
returns the payoff P for the full length of the game (a certain N periods plus an
expected additional 1/
(
1− δ˜
)
periods. Similarly with probability 1 − p˜ a cooper-
ating player is met which returns T just once, followed by P thereafter when that
player switches to defect.
The payoff from playing “sophisticated cooperation” is given by:
p˜(S + (Ni − 1)P + P
1− δ˜ ) + (1− p˜)(NiR+
R
1− δ˜ ) (6)
The intuition is much the same. With probability p˜ an “always defect”
players is met returning the payoff S once and P thereafter. With probability 1− p˜
cooperation is sustained for the full duration of the game.
The probability that makes the individual indifferent between playing “so-
phisticated cooperation” and “always defect”, p, can be calculated by equating
expression 5 and expression 6; hence:
p(δ˜) =
R−P
1−δ˜ − (Ni − 1)P +NiR− T
R−P
1−δ˜ − 2(Ni − 1)P +NiP +NiR− S − T
(7)
so that it is optimal to play a sophisticated cooperation strategy iff p˜ < p(δ˜).
Substituting R = 51;T = 63;S = 22;P = 39;Ni = 10 and δ˜ = 0.5, we have
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that the numerical value of the threshold is
p = 0.876.
If individuals attribute different values to δ and given that expression 7 is
monotonically increasing in δ˜ for the above parameters, they will play more often
always defect the smaller is δ˜.
As before the accuracy in the calculation of p depends on the computational
capacity of the players, who may make mistakes in the calculation of the expected
values of expression 5 and expression 6 or in the solution of the equation of the two
expressions. Furthermore, individuals may misperceive the probability of termina-
tion after 10 rounds, considering a value δ˜ different from 0.5. We call d a mistake
in the calculation of the game duration and we define subjects with better capacity of
calculation of the game duration as the ones for which it is more likely that d = 0.
Accordingly, each individual estimates p˜(c, d), such that p˜(0, 0) = p.
Now, considering the cognitive channel described in the introduction, and
the above definitions in terms of subjects’ cognitive capacities, we can make the
following hypothesis: Subjects in the neutral mood treatment have:
• a better capacity to predict their partner’s move
• a better computational capacity
• a better capacity to estimate the correct duration of the game
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I Chapter 3: Experiment Dates
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J Chapter 3: Experiment Instructions
Verbal Instruction
Good morning/afternoon and thank you for coming to participate in our economic
experiment. Before we begin, can you please confirm that the number on the card
handed to you while coming in matches with the number on the cubicle that you
are seated in. Just a few points before we begin:
1. Please read all the instructions carefully, there are 3 parts of the experiment
and detailed instructions for each part will be coming on your screen.
2. In the first part, you will be asked to read some simple statements while
listening to an audio track. You have been provided with headphones for
this part of the experiment, you will need this only for the first part of the
experiment, so you can keep it aside after that. Try turning the volume in
your headphones to maximum if you cannot hear properly.
3. In the second part, you will take part in decision tasks and your payoff will be
based on your performance in these tasks. You will be paid for one of these
tasks, randomly chosen.
4. In the third and final part there will be some questions for you to answer.
5. Please do not talk to each other at any point, if you have any questions, raise
your hand and the experimenter will come to you.
6. Also bear in mind that you may have to wait few moments during the experi-
ment, as we want everyone to finish at the same time, you will see the message
Please wait on your screen when this is applicable.
7. Any questions?
We will now begin the first part of the experiment.
Start General Instruction Mood- Positive/ Neutral (Screen Instructions)
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Thank you for coming to participate in our economic experiment. By carefully
reading the following instructions, you can - depending on your decisions - earn
up to 20, including the show-up fee of 4. It is, therefore, of importance that you
accurately read these instructions. During the whole experiment communication
with other participants is not allowed. Therefore, we ask you to not speak with each
other. If you do not understand something, please ask the experimenter by raising
your hand. We will come to your place and answer your question individually.
Today’s experiment consists of 3 parts. Detailed instructions for each part will
follow.
In the first part, you will be asked to read some simple statements while listening
to an audio track. You have been provided with headphones for this part of the
experiment. In the second part, you will take part in decision tasks and your payoff
will be based on your performance in these tasks. You will be paid for one of these
tasks, randomly chosen. In the third and final part there will be some questions for
you to answer. We will now begin the first part of the experiment.
(Mood Positive*) In the first part of this experiment, you will be shown a series
of screens with statements typed on them and you will hear some music in the
background. The success of this part of the experiment will largely depend on your
willingness to be receptive and responsive to the idea in each statement, and to allow
each idea to act upon you without interference. These ideas are called suggestions.
First, as each statement appears, you will simply read it to yourself, and then go
over each statement again in your head with the determination and willingness to
really believe it. You will try to experience each idea; you will concentrate your
full attention on it and exclude other ideas which are unrelated to the mood; like,
”Ill see if this will work.” Following these statements, there will be a brief series of
simple tasks to perform, and following those, there will be a brief questionnaire that
you will have to answer.
(Mood Neutral*) In the first part of this experiment, you will be shown a series
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of screens with statements typed on them and you will hear some music in the
background. The success of this part of the experiment will largely depend on your
willingness to concentrate on each of the statements as they are placed before you,
and make an effort to continue to do so until the next statement appears.First,
as each statement appears, you will simply read it to yourself, then go over each
statement again in your head with the determination and willingness to really believe
it. Following these statements, there will be a brief series of simple tasks to perform,
and following those, there will be a brief questionnaire that you will have to answer.
Thank you for completing the first part. You can now take off your headphone and
keep it aside. We will now proceed to the next part.
Start Encryption Task (Screen Instruction)
You will now participate in the encryption task. This task consists of encoding
combinations of letters (words) into numbers. The three capital letters yield a
word. You have to allocate a number to each capital letter. The encryption code
can be found in a table below the corresponding letter. For that purpose, please
consider the following screenshot:
In this example the participant has already encrypted the first letter correctly (see
centered field: above). Here, the three capital letters: V, S and P have to be
encoded. The solution follows immediately from the table: (see the current entry of
the participant)
• For V applies: 108
• For S applies: 785
• For P applies: 537
To make an input please click on the blue box below the first capital letter. If all
3 numbers have been entered, please click the button OK. The experiment starts
with a trial period in which each participant has to encrypt exactly 2 sets of letters.
Please note: Correct solutions within the trial period will not be paid. After the
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trial period, you will start the actual task that will last for 10 minutes. Each correct
encryption corresponds to 1.
Thank you for completing the encryption task.
The next three tasks that you will face will involve making decisions in a pair and
will give you the opportunity to amplify your payment from the encryption task.
Only one of these three tasks will be chosen to calculate your final payment. The
task will be chosen at random, in advance.
Start Task 1:Public Goods Game
Screen Instruction In this task you will make decisions in a pair. You will be ran-
domly matched with another person in the room; both of your identities remain
anonymous. You and your partner are presented with the same set of instructions.
Your payoff from the task is dependent on the decisions you make as well as the
decisions of other participant. For the purposes of this task, the money you have
earned in the encryption task will be called your endowment. You will be given
the choice of how much, if any, of this endowment to allocate toward the communal
purchasing of a public good. The amount you and your partner contribute to the
fund will be multiplied by 1.5 and then the total amount will be divided equally
among the two of you. Your total payoff from this task depends on: (a) the total
size of your endowment minus your contribution (b) the total amount in the group
fund divided by 2 More explicitly, your individual payoff function is expressed as
follows: Your Payoff= (Your endowment-your contribution) + [(your contribution+
your partners contribution) x 1.5 /2] Task: What percentage of your endowment
would you like to contribute to the public fund? Belief Elicitation: After you make
your decision, you will be asked to state the likelihood you expect your partner to
decide one action. Depending on how accurate you are when stating this likelihood
you can earn additional experimental units that will be added to your eventual pay-
off. To determine the units earned we will use the following method: Your stated
likelihood, call this ”R”, will be entered into the following formula where ”r” de-
A.22
notes the realised action of your partner. 1 - ( R/100 - r/100 )2. This produces a
number between 0 and 1. This number of units will then be multiplied by 2 and you
will be paid that amount. Example: Assume you are guessing that your partner
will contribute 601 - (.60/100 - .40/100) 2= 1 (0.2)2 = 0.96 Thus 0.96 units will be
multiplied by 1 to add to your final pay-off. Note that the closer your estimate is to
the real action of your partner, the more units you stand to earn. It is in your best
interest to state what you truly think the other person will do. You will be paid for
one of the likelihood estimation, chosen randomly.
Start Task 2 and 3: Trust Game: Sender and Receiver strategy
Screen Instruction: In this task you will make decisions in a pair. You will be ran-
domly matched with another person in the room; both of your identities remain
anonymous. You and your partner is presented with the same set of instructions.
Your payoff from the task is dependent on the decisions you make as well as the
decisions of other participant.
For the purposes of this task, the money you have earned in the encryption task
will be called your endowment. You will be assigned the role of either a Sender or
a Receiver. If you are the Sender you can choose to send some percentage (0% to
100%) of your endowment to the Receiver. The amount you choose to send will be
doubled by the experimenter. The Receiver has the option to return some percent-
age (0% to 100%) of the amount that he/she received back to you.
So, if you are the sender, your payoff from this task depends on:
(a) the total size of your endowment minus your offer to your partner
(b) the amount your partner returns from the amplified amount
More explicitly, your individual payoff function is expressed as follows: Your Pay-
off= your endowment-your offer + the amount your partner returns
If you are the Receiver, your total payoff from this task depends on:
(a) the total size of your endowment
(b) amount your partner sends you minus what you decide to return
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More explicitly, your individual payoff function is expressed as follows: Your Pay-
off= Your endowment + (the amount your partner sends x 2) - the amount you
return
If you are the Sender, you will be given the choice of how much, if any, of your
endowment to give to your partner. If you are the Receiver, you will have to decide
how much, if any, of the amount you receive from your partner to return to your
partner.
The next screen you see will ask you to choose a percentage of your endowment that
you would like to send to your partner. This can be from 0% to 100%
Sender offer: If you are the Sender, what percentage of your endowment would you
like to send to your partner?
Sender belief about Receiver: What percentage of the amount the Receiver receives
do you think he/she will return to you? (Out of 100)
Responder return: If you are the Receiver, what percentage of the amount you re-
ceive would you like to send back to the Sender?
Responder belief about Sender: What percentage of your partner’s (Senders) en-
dowment do you think he/she will send to you? (Out of 100)
Start Questionnaire.
• Personal Information:
• GMAT questions
• Risk Elicitation: DOSPERT (30 item)
• Social Risk and Trust questions
• Mood, life good and political belief
• Life tragedy
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K Chapter 3: Encryption Task
L Chapter 3: Histogram of offers
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M Chapter 3: GMAT questions
1. Harriet wants to put up fencing around three sides of her rectangular yard
and leave a side of 20 feet unfenced. If the yard has an area of 680 square feet,
how many feet of fencing does she need?
2. If x + 5y = 16 and x = -3y, then y =?
3. If basis points are defined so that 1 percent is equal to 100 basis points, then
82.5 percent is how many basis points greater than 62.5 percent?
4. Which of the following best completes the passage below?
In a survey of job applicants, two-fifths admitted to being at least a little
dishonest. However, the survey may underestimate the proportion of job ap-
plicants who are dishonest, because.
a) some dishonest people taking the survey might have claimed on the survey
to be honest.
b) some generally honest people taking the survey might have claimed on the
survey to be dishonest.
c) some people who claimed on the survey to be at least a little dishonest may
be very dishonest.
d) some people who claimed on the survey to be dishonest may have been
answering honestly.
e) some people who are not job applicants are probably at least a little dis-
honest.
5. People buy prestige when they buy a premium product. They want to be asso-
ciated with something special. Mass-marketing techniques and price-reduction
strategies should not be used because .
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a) aﬄuent purchasers currently represent a shrinking portion of the population
of all purchasers.
b) continued sales depend directly on the maintenance of an aura of exclusivity.
c) purchasers of premium products are concerned with the quality as well as
with the price of the products.
d) expansion of the market niche to include a broader spectrum of consumers
will increase profits.
e) manufacturing a premium brand is not necessarily more costly than manu-
facturing a standard brand of the same product.
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N Velten Statements
Statements for positive mood subjects
1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day.
2. I do feel pretty good today, though.
3. I feel light hearted.
4. This might turn out to have been one of my good days.
5. If your attitude is good, then things are good, and my attitude is good.
6. I’ve certainly got energy and self-confidence to spare.
7. I feel cheerful and lively.
8. On the whole, I have very little difficulty in thinking clearly.
9. For the rest of the day, I bet things will go really well.
10. I am pleased that most people are so friendly to me.
11. My judgement about most things is sound.
12. I am full of energy and ambition; I feel like i could go a long time without sleep
13. This is one of those days when I can grind out school work with practically no
effort at all.
14. My judgement is keen and precise today; just let someone try to put something
over on me.
15. If I set my mind to it, I can make things turn out fine.
16. I feel enthusiastic and confident now.
17. Some of my friends are so lively and optimistic.
18. I feel talkative; i feel like talking to almost anybody.
19. I am full of energy, and I am really getting to like the things Im doing on
campus.
20. I am able to do things accurately and efficiently.
21. I know good and well that I can achieve the goals I set.
22. Now that it occurs to me, most of the things that have depressed me wouldn’t
have if Id just had the right attitude.
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23. I have a sense of power and vigour.
24. I feel so vivacious and efficient today; sitting on top of the world.
25. It would really take something to stop me now!
26. In the long run, it’s obvious that things have gotten better and better during
my life.
27. I know that in the future i won’t over-emphasize so-called ”problems”.
28. I am optimistic that I can get along very well with most of the people I meet
29. I am too absorbed in things to have time for worry.
30. I am feeling amazingly good today!
31. I am particularly inventive and resourceful in this mood.
32. I feel superb! I think I can work to the best of my ability.
33. I can find good in almost anything.
34. I feel so happy and playful today I feel like surprising someone by telling a silly
joke.
35. I feel an exhilarating animation in all I do.
36. I feel highly perceptive and refreshed.
37. In a buoyant mood like this one, I can work fast and do it right the first time.
38. I can concentrate hard on anything I do.
39. My thinking is clear and rapid.
40. Life is so much fun; it seems to offer so many sources of fulfilment.
41. I feel industrious as heck; I want something to do!
42. I can make decisions rapidly and correctly and I can defend them against
criticism easily.
43. Life is firmly in my control.
44. I wish somebody would play some good loud music!
45. This is great; I really do feel good, I feel elated about things.
46. I am really feeling sharp now.
47. This is just one of those days when I am ready to go!
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48. I feel like bursting out with laughter; I wish somebody would tell a joke and
give me an excuse!
49. I am full of energy
50. God, I feel great!
Statements for neutral mood subjects
1. Oklahoma City is the largest city in the world in area, with 631.166 square miles.
2. At the end appears a section entitled ”bibliography notes.”
3. We have two kinds of nouns denoting physical things: individual and mass nouns.
4. This book or any part thereof must not be reproduced in any form.
5. Agricultural products comprised seventy per cent of the income.
6. Saturn is sometimes in conjunction, beyond the sun from the earth, and is not
visible.
7. Some streets were still said to be listed under their old names.
8. The system is supervised by its board of regents.
9. There is a large rose-growing centre near Tyler, Texas.
10. The typography, paper and bind were of the highest quality.
11. The machine dominated county posts for as long as anyone could remember.
12. The desk was old and scratched into its surface was a profusion of dates, initials,
and leading messages.
13. The Orient Express travels between Paris and Istanbul.
14. When the banyan bent down under its own weight, its branches began to take
root.
15. The Hope Diamond was shipped from South Africa to London through the
regular mail service.
16. The review is concerned with the first three volumes.
17. The ship was ancient, and would soon be retired from the fleet.
18. Slang is a constantly changing part of the language.
19. There is a small article in the local newspaper which indicates acceptance of the
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kidnappers’ terms.
20. There are some forms in which no oath is required.
21. Two men dressed as repairmen will appear shortly after the van pulls up.
22. The wood was discoloured as if it had been held in a fire.
23. A light was noticed in the dark outside, and it moved eerily towards the house.
24. Painting in a few other non-European countries is treated in a separate volume.
25. Provoked arousal and orientation are accompanied by steeper negative shifts.
26. The names on the Christmas mailing list are alphabetically ordered.
27. Significantly, these changes occur during the full moon.
28. West Samoa gained its independence in 1965.
29. The magazine’s report was slanted, as usual.
30. The map would prove useless as a beginning guide.
31. The speaker outlined a plan whereby the current deficits could be eliminated.
32. Black and white pictures are arranged in ten sections.
33. The papers had been front-paging it for days.
34. The notice made it clear that coffee breaks were being limited.
35. No man worked harder than he.
36. Potter wrote numerous satires on social cynicism.
37. Boeing’s main plant in Seattle employs 35,000 people.
38. The doorkeeper was dressed in red.
39. During the next ten years, the group participated in politics.
40. The organization depended on the people for support.
41. In 1965, Elizabeth made the first state visit by a British monarch to Germany
in 56 years.
42. It was their sixth consecutive best seller.
43. It all fitted in with the officer’s story.
44. The merger did not change the company’s policy.
45. The mansion was rented by the delegation.
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46. Changes were made in transport of lumber after the border incident.
47. The Chinese language has many dialects, including Cantonese, Mandarin, and
Wu.
48. Things were booming once again in the little cold rush town of angel.
49. At low tide the hulk of the old ship could be seen.
50. A free sample will be given to each person who enters the store.
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O Big Five Personality
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P Risk Preference DOSPERT item
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